Human factors approaches and models in LOC-I accident analysis and prevention: flight crew resource management techniques as a risk mitigation tool

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Sikora, Ivan ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2314-9724, Hari, Benjamin L. and Hanusch, Moritz (2020) Human factors approaches and models in LOC-I accident analysis and prevention: flight crew resource management techniques as a risk mitigation tool. International Journal of Safety and Security Engineering, 10 (3). pp. 301-310. ISSN 2041-9031

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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.18280/ijsse.100301

Abstract

Increased cockpit automation on modern jet aircraft aim to reduce the risk of Undesired Aircraft State (UAS) instances such as Loss of Control in Flight (LOC-I). Although LOCI globally accounts for only 9% of all analysed accidents IATA has reported that it was responsible for 58% of all accident fatalities in 2017. The focus of this paper is to answer whether Threat and Error Management and Crew Resources Management (CRM) techniques are an efficient risk management tool when facing a LOC-I threat. Three LOCI final aircraft accident reports were analysed to understand the structure of Human Factors (HF) during these flights. Methods from the HF field such as the Generic Error Modelling System (GEMS) and Skill-, Rule- and Knowledge-based (SRK) error approach provided invaluable insights to identify potential findings. A holistic investigation of cognitive structures in flight path management helped to visualise latent conditions and cognitively demanding tasks during LOC-I in routine operations. Bearing in mind the limited number of cases considered in this paper it should be considered as an overview in LOC-I accident analysis. It shows that leadership and teamwork, as essential aspects of CRM training, can serve as key strategies to mitigate HF problems and LOC-I risks.

Item Type:	Article
Identifier:	10.18280/ijsse.100301
Additional Information:	The original publication is available also at https://www.iieta.org
Keywords:	automation, human factors, manual flying skills, crew resource management, threat and error management
Subjects:	Business and finance > Business and management > Corporate governance Hospitality and tourism > Hospitality > Risk and reputation management
Related URLs:	Author Publisher
Depositing User:	Ivan Sikora
Date Deposited:	22 Oct 2020 10:10
Last Modified:	06 Feb 2024 16:04
URI:	https://repository.uwl.ac.uk/id/eprint/7414

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Human factors approaches and models in LOC-I accident analysis and prevention: flight crew resource management techniques as a risk mitigation tool

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