Lockie, Robert ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8340-5158 (2018) Free will and epistemology: a defence of the transcendental argument for freedom. Bloomsbury Academic, London and New York, pp. 67-106. ISBN 978-1-3500-2904-0; 978-1-3500-2906-4; 978-1-3500-2905-7

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Abstract

This is a work concerned with justification and freedom and the relationship between these. Its summational aim is to defend a transcendental argument for free will – that we could not be epistemically justified in undermining a strong notion of free will, as a strong notion of free will would be required for any such process of undermining to be itself epistemically justified. The book advances two transcendental arguments – for a deontically internalist conception of epistemic justification and the aforementioned argument for a libertarian conception of free will. In defending each of these arguments, the book both defends and relies upon the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. In articulating the latter transcendental argument – for freedom – heavy reliance is made on the earlier, epistemic, work: especially on the deontological conception of rational justification (on epistemic internalism).

Item Type:	Book
Additional Information:	This is an Accepted Manuscript of a book chapter published by Bloomsbury Academic in Free Will and Epistemology: A Defence of the Transcendental Argument for Freedom on 11-01-2018, available online: https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/free-will-and-epistemology-9781350029040/.
Keywords:	Epistemic Responsibility, Ethics of Belief, Free Will and Psychology, Free Will and Responsibility, Transcendental Arguments
Subjects:	Philosophy Psychology
Related URLs:	Author
Depositing User:	Bob Lockie
Date Deposited:	14 Dec 2017 15:39
Last Modified:	04 Nov 2024 12:34
URI:	https://repository.uwl.ac.uk/id/eprint/4195

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