Edris, Ed Kamya Kiyemba, Aiash, Mahdi and Loo, Jonathan ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2197-8126 (2020) Formal Verification and Analysis of Primary Authentication based on 5G-AKA Protocol. In: 2020 Seventh International Conference on Software Defined Systems (SDS), 20-23 Apr 2020, Paris, France.

Preview

PDF Formal Verification and Analysis of Primary Authentication based on 5G-AKA Protocol_AAM.pdf - Accepted Version Download (264kB) | Preview

Abstract

Fifth generation mobile network (5G) is intended to solve future constraints for accessing network services. The user and network operator depend on security assurances provided by the Authentication and Key Agreement protocols (AKA) used. For 5G network, the AKA has been standardized and 5GAKA protocol is one of the primary authentication methods that have been defined. This paper models the protocol and provides comprehensive formal analysis on 5G-AKA protocol as specified by The Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) standard. Using ProVerif a security protocol verification tool, we perform a full systematic evaluation of the 5G-AKA protocol based on the latest 5G specifications. We present security assumptions and properties that assists on the analysis based on two taxonomies, we find out that some important security properties are not achieved, and related work ignored some crucial protocol flaws. Finally, we make some recommendations to address the issues found by our security analysis.

Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)
ISBN:	9781728172194
Identifier:	10.1109/SDS49854.2020.9143899
Identifier:	10.1109/SDS49854.2020.9143899
Keywords:	Protocols , Authentication , 5G mobile communication , Tools , Analytical models , Software
Subjects:	Computing > Information security
Depositing User:	Marc Forster
Date Deposited:	17 Dec 2024 09:42
Last Modified:	17 Dec 2024 09:45
URI:	https://repository.uwl.ac.uk/id/eprint/13000

Downloads

Actions (login required)

View Item