Virtue epistemology and the sources of epistemic value

Lockie, Robert ORCID: 0000-0001-8340-5158 (2017) Virtue epistemology and the sources of epistemic value. In: Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology. Routledge. (In Press)

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Abstract

A basic question for virtue epistemology is whether it represents a ‘third force’ – a different source of normativity to that offered by internalism and externalism. It is argued that virtue epistemology does not offer us a distinct source of normativity. It is also argued that virtue theories offer us nothing that can unify the internalist and externalist sub-components of their preferred state of ‘virtue’. Claims that phronesis can unify a virtues-based axiology are specifically opposed.

Item Type: Book Section
Subjects: Philosophy
Depositing User: Bob Lockie
Date Deposited: 15 Mar 2018 12:56
Last Modified: 15 Mar 2018 15:39
URI: http://repository.uwl.ac.uk/id/eprint/4728

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