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Secure Digital Voting System based on Blockchain Technology

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ABSTRACT

Abstract: Electronic voting or e-voting has been used in varying forms since 1970s with fundamental benefits over paper based systems such as increased efficiency and reduced errors. However, there remain challenges to achieve wide spread adoption of such systems especially with respect to improving their resilience against potential faults. Blockchain is a disruptive technology of current era and promises to improve the overall resilience of e-voting systems. This paper presents an effort to leverage benefits of blockchain such as cryptographic foundations and transparency to achieve an effective scheme for e-voting. The proposed scheme conforms to the fundamental requirements for e-voting schemes and achieves end-to-end verifiability. The paper presents details of the proposed e-voting scheme along with its implementation using Multichain platform. The paper presents in-depth evaluation of the scheme which successfully demonstrates its effectiveness to achieve an end-to-end verifiable e-voting scheme.

Keywords: electronic voting, e-voting, blockchain, e-government, verifiable voting

INTRODUCTION

Elections are fundamental pillar of a democratic system enabling the general public to express their views in the form of a vote. Due to their significance to our society, the election process should be transparent and reliable so as to ensure participants of its credibility. Within this context, the approach to voting has been an ever evolving domain. This evolution is primarily driven by the efforts to make the system secure, verifiable and transparent. In view of its significance, continuous efforts have been made to improve overall efficiency and resilience of the voting system. Electronic voting or e-voting has a profound role in this. Since its first use as punched-card ballots in 1960's, e-voting systems have achieved remarkable progress with its adaption using the internet technologies (Gobel et al, 2015). However, e-voting systems must adhere to specific benchmark parameters so as to facilitate its widespread adoption. These parameters include anonymity of the voter, integrity of the vote and non-repudiation among others.

Blockchain is one of the emerging technologies with strong cryptographic foundations enabling applications to leverage these abilities to achieve resilient security solutions. A Blockchain resembles a data structure which maintains and shares all the transactions being executed through its genesis. It is primarily a distributed decentralized database that maintains a complete list of constantly germinating and growing data records secured from unauthorized manipulating, tampering and revision. Blockchain

allows every user to connect to the network, send new transactions to it, verify transactions and create new blocks (Rosenfeld, 2017; Kadam et al, 2015; Nakamoto, 2009). Each block is assigned a cryptographic hash (which may also be treated as a finger print of the block) that remains valid as long as the data in the block is not altered. If any changes are made in the block, the cryptographic hash would change immediately indicating the change in the data which may be due to a malicious activity. Therefore, due to its strong foundations in cryptography, blockchain has been increasingly used to mitigate against unauthorized transactions across various domains (Nakamoto, 2009; Kraft, 2015; Narayanan et al, 2015).

Bitcoin remains the most distinguished application of blockchain however researchers are keen to explore the use of blockchain technology to facilitate applications across different domains leveraging benefits such as non-repudiation, integrity and anonymity. In this paper, we explore the use of blockchain to facilitate e-voting applications with the ability to assure voter anonymity, vote integrity and end-to-verification. We believe e-voting can leverage from fundamental blockchain features such as self-cryptographic validation structure among transactions (through hashes) and public availability of distributed ledger of records. The blockchain technology can play key role in the domain of electronic voting due to inherent nature of preserving anonymity, maintaining decentralized and publicly distributed ledger of transactions across all the nodes. This makes blockchain technology very efficient to deal with the threat of utilizing a voting token more than once and the attempt to influence the transparency of the result.

The focus of our research is to investigate the key issues such as voter anonymity, vote confidentiality and end-to-end verification. These challenges form the foundation of an efficient voting system preserving the integrity of the voting process. In this paper, we present our efforts to explore the use of the blockchain technology to seek solutions to these challenges. In particular, our system is based on the Prêt à Voter approach (Ryan, 2008) and uses an open source blockchain platform, Multichain (Multichain, 2017) as the underlying technology to develop our system. In order to protect the anonymity and integrity of a vote, the system generates strong cryptographic hash for each vote transaction based on information specific to a voter. This hash is also communicated to the voter using encrypted channels to facilitate verification. The system therefore conforms with the fundamental requirements of an e-voting system as identified by (Rura et al, 2016). More discussion around this is presented in section 2.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section presents the requirements for an e-voting system as identified by (Rura et al, 2016) and explains how our proposed system fulfils them. Section 3 presents the state-of-the-art with respect to e-voting and how we contribute to it followed by a detailed description of the system design in section 4. Section 5 presents the implementation of our proposed system with Multichain and user interface along with evaluation of the system highlighting how it achieves the requirements presented in section 2. Section 6 concludes the paper identifying current progress and plans for further work.

E-VOTING BACKGROUND AND REQUIREMENTS

Electronic voting has been an area of research focus for many years by using computing machines and equipment for casting votes and producing high quality and precise results in accordance with the sentiments of the participating voters. Various attempts have been adopted in practice to support election process. Initially computer counting system allowed the voter to cast vote on papers. Later on, those cards went through the process of scanning and tallying at every polling cell on a central server (Kadam et al, 2015; Rockwell, 2017; Hao et al, 2010). Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting systems were put in place later on which were admired and acknowledged greatly by the voters in spite of the resistance from computer scientists. If the voting system is well understood by the voters, the system's usability can be increased remarkably. DRE systems in particular have gathered a lot of successes in bringing the voters to use this technology. These systems work more or less in the same way as any conventional election system does. In the case of DRE, a voter begins his journey by going to their polling place and get their token to vote where he utilizes his token at the voting terminal to vote for his candidate. When the candidate selection procedure is completed, DRE systems present the final selection to the voter before actually casting it (in case if the voter wants to change his opinion) and after the final selection, the ballot casting is completed (Multichain, 2017; Dalia et al, 2012).

More recently, distributed ledger technologies such as blockchain have been used to achieve e-voting systems primarily due to their advantages in terms of end-to-end verifiability. With properties such as anonymity, privacy protection and non-repudiation, blockchain is a very attractive alternative to contemporary e-voting systems. The research presented in this paper also attempts to leverage these properties of blockchain to achieve an efficient e-voting system. A detailed analysis of such systems is presented in the next section along with the identification of comparison with these approaches.

e-Voting Requirements and Compliance by the Proposed System

The generic requirements for a typical e-voting system have been defined in (Rura et al, 2016). We present a brief description of each requirement along with an explanation of how the proposed system fulfils it.

Privacy - Keeping an individual's vote secret

The system leverages cryptographic properties of blockchain to achieve privacy of a voter. More specifically, as voter is registered into the system, a voter hash is generated by blockchain which is the unique identifier of a voter into the blockchain, and is protected from misuse due to collision resistance property of the cryptographic hash. Due to this, the traceability of a vote is also non-trivial thereby protecting the voter when under duress.

Eligibility - Allowing only registered voters to vote, with each such voter voting only once

All eligible users are required to register using unique identifiers such as government-issued documents to assert their eligibility. In addition to this, our system implements strong authentication mechanism using

finger printing technology to assert that only authorized voters can access the system. Furthermore, the use of biometrics also enables the system to protect against double voting.

Receipt Freeness - Voters should be unable to prove to a third party that they voted in a particular way

The proposed system enables a voter to vote as per their choice and creates a cryptographic hash for each such event (transaction). This is important to achieve verifiability i.e. to verify if a certain vote was included in the count. However, possession of this hash does not allow to extract information about the way voter has voted.

Convenience - Voters must be able to vote easily, and everyone who is eligible must be able to vote

The system has been implemented using a user friendly web based interface with the voting process requiring minimal input from the user. For instance, fingerprinting is implemented for authentication mechanism to avoid the requirement to remember username/passwords. Furthermore, the overall process is integrated which enables the user to interact with it in a seamless manner.

Verifiability - The ability to trust the vote tallying process

Upon casting their vote successfully, a user is provided with their unique transaction ID in the form of a cryptographic hash. A user can use this transaction ID to track if their vote was included in the tallying process. However, this process does not enable a user to view how they voted which has been adopted to mitigate threats when under duress.

The analysis presented above highlights the performance of the proposed system with respect to the specific requirements of e-voting. It also highlights the significance of defining characteristics of blockchain and their profound role in achieving the cornerstones of an efficient e-voting system. Therefore, we believe the work presented here makes significant contribution to the existing knowledge with respect to the application of blockchain technology to achieve a secure digital voting system.

RELATED WORKS

In (Kiayias & Yung, 2002), a self-tallying voting system is proposed that does not require any trusted third parties for vote aggregation and any private channel for voter-to-voter privacy. The proposed protocol involves extensive computation. In (Hao et al, 2010) a two round protocol is proposed that computes the tally in two rounds without using a private channel or a trusted third party. The protocol is efficient in terms of computation and bandwidth consumption but is neither robust nor fair in certain conditions (Dalia et al, 2012). In (Dalia et al, 2012) a protocol is proposed to improve the robustness and fairness of the two round protocol (Hao et al, 2010). In (Shahandashti & Hao, 2016), authors propose E2E verifiable voting system named DRE-ip (DRE-i with enhanced privacy), that overcomes limitations of DRE-i (Chaum et al, 2008). Instead of pre-computing ciphertexts, DRE-ip encrypts the vote on the fly during voting process. DRE-ip achieves E2E verifiability without TAs, but at the same time provides a

significantly stronger privacy guarantee than DRE-i. In (Chaum, 2004) end-to-end verifiability is achieved through the Mixnet protocol (Chaum, 1981) that recovers the plaintext ballot in an unlikable manner by randomizing the ciphertext through a chain of mix servers.

Scantegrity is proposed in (Chaum et al, 2008) that achieves end-to-end (E2E) verifiability with confirmation codes that allow voters to prove to themselves that their ballots are included in the final tally as they really are. Another scheme Prêt à Voter based on (Chaum, 2004) is proposed in (Chaum et al, 2005) that ensures privacy by constructing the ballot with two columns i.e. voting options are listed in one column and the voter's choice is entered in an adjacent column. The work in (Adida & Rivest, 2006) is based on Prêt à Voter but using homomorphic tabulation and it uses scratch stripes to allow off-line auditing of ballots. Other systems that have been proposed for electronic voting include: Bingo Voting (Bohli et al, 2007), Helios (Adida, 2008), DRE-i (Hao et al, 2014) and DRE-ip (Shahandashti & Hao, 2016), Star-Vote (Bell et al, 2013) and (Sandler et al, 2008) to name a few.




Fig. 1 Architecture for proposed e-voting system.

The existing approaches perform well for end-to-end verifiability without compromising the privacy of voters. In (McCorry et al, 2017), authors presented the implementation of decentralized and self-tallying internet voting protocol over the blockchain using Ethereum. Authors used the openvote (Chaum et al, 2008) e-voting approach as their baseline.

The focus of our research is to explore the exciting opportunities presented by blockchain technologies by investigating their application in diverse application domains. Within this context, this paper presents our efforts to develop an e-voting system by leveraging blockchain technology. To this end, our proposed scheme fulfils the specific requirements for e-voting as discussed in section 2 and illustrated further in the following sections.

PROPOSED SYSTEM DEISGN

The proposed e-voting system is based on the well-established Prêt à Voter e-voting approach identified in (Ryan, 2008). The system has been designed to support a voting application in the real world environment taking into account specific requirements such as privacy, eligibility, convenience, receipt-freeness and verifiability. The proposed system aims to achieve secure digital voting without compromising its usability. Within this context, the system is designed using a web-based interface to facilitate user engagement with measures such as finger printing to protect against double voting. With a clear need to administer the voters, constituencies and candidates for constituencies, a user-friendly administrator interface is implemented to enable ease of access. Furthermore, the system allows all voters equal rights of participation and develops a fair and healthy competition among all the candidates while keeping the anonymity of the voters preserved. The cryptographic hash of the transaction (ID) is emailed to the voter as a proof that the vote has been casted which may later on be tracked outside the premises of the constituency.

Detailed Description of the Layered Approach

The proposed e-voting system architecture is presented in Fig. 1 and has been divided into several layers to achieve modular design. These layers are described below;

User Interaction and Front-end Security layer is responsible for interacting with a voter (to support vote casting functions) and the administrator (to support functions pertaining to administering the election process). It encapsulates two key functions i.e. authentication and authorization of the users (voters and administrators) to ensure that the access to the system is restricted to legitimate users in accordance with the predefined access control policies. A number of different methods can be applied to achieve this function ranging from basic username/password to more advanced such as fingerprinting or iris recognition. Therefore these are rendered specific to individual implementation of the proposed architecture. Overall, this layer serves as the first point of contact with the users and is responsible for validating user credentials as governed by the system-specific policies.

Access Control Management layer is envisaged to facilitate layer 1 and layer 3 by providing services required for these layers to achieve their expected functions. These services include roles definition, their respective access control policies and voting transaction definitions. The role definition and management provides core support for the access control functions implemented by layer 1 whereas the voting transaction definitions support the blockchain based transaction mapping and mining performed at the layer 3. Overall, this layer enables a coherent function of the proposed system by providing the foundations required by individual layers.

e-Voting Transaction Management layer is the core layer of the architecture where the transaction for e-voting constructed at Role Management / Transactions layer is mapped onto the blockchain transaction to be mined. This mapped transaction also contains the credentials provided by a voter at layer 1 for authentication. An example of such data can be the fingerprint of the voter. This data is then used to create the cryptographic hash and contributes towards creating the transaction ID. The verification of such credentials is envisioned to be achieved at User Interaction and Front-end Security layer (layer 1). A number of virtual instances of nodes are involved in the process of mining to get this transaction finally enter into the chain.

Ledger Synchronization layer synchronizes Multichain ledger with the local application specific database using one of the existing database technologies. Votes cast are recorded in the data tables at the backend of the database. Voters are able to track their votes using the unique identifier provided to them as soon as their vote is mined and added into the blockchain ledger. The security considerations of the votes are based on block-chain technology using cryptographic hashes to secure end-to-end communication. Voting results are also stored in the application's database with the view to facilitate auditing and any further operations at a later stage.

The Voting Process

We now describe a typical interaction of a user with the proposed scheme based on our current implementation of the system. Typically, a voter logs into the system by providing his/her thumb impression. If the match is found, the voter is then presented with a list of available candidates with the option to cast vote against them. On the contrary, if the match is unsuccessful, any further access would be denied. This function is achieved using appropriate implementation of the authentication mechanism (fingerprinting in this case) and predefined role based access control management. Furthermore, it is also envisioned that a voter is assigned to their specific constituency and this information is used to develop the list of candidates that a voter can vote for. The assignment of voter to a constituency is rendered an offline process and therefore out of scope of this research.

After a successful vote-cast, it is mined by multiple miners for validation following which valid and verified votes are added into public ledger. The security considerations of the votes are based on blockchain technology using cryptographic hashes to secure end-to-end verification. To this end, a successful vote cast is considered as a transaction within the blockchain of the voting application. Therefore, a vote cast is added as a new block (after successful mining) in the blockchain as well as being recorded in data tables at the backend of the database. The system ensures only one-person, one-vote (democracy) property of voting systems. This is achieved by using the voter's unique thumbprint, which is matched at the beginning of every voting attempt to prevent double voting. A transaction is generated as soon as the vote is mined by the miners which is unique for each vote. If the vote is found malicious it is rejected by miners.

After validation process, a notification is immediately sent to the voter through message or an email providing the above defined transaction id by which user can track his/her vote into the ledger. Although this functions as a notification to the voter however it does not enable any user to extract the information about how a specific voter voted thereby achieving privacy of a voter. It is important here to note that

cryptographic hash for a voter is the unique hash of voter by which voter is known in the blockchain. This property facilitates achieving verifiability of the overall voting process. Furthermore, this id is hidden and no one can view it even a system operator cannot view this hash therefore achieving privacy of individual voters.

```
proofChain: Issue 1GKUTKXjCWUj1ZHAE7yBU66dAXexh7UjXH6Ad6 myAsset 1 1
{"method":"Issue","params":["1GKUTKXjCWUj1ZHAE7yBU66dAXexh7UjXH6Ad6","my
5e85876c9d42aa58d1db74cfea98b6bdc5dd3fe7f339d3482f569876c6b3f61d
proofChain: █
```

Fig. 2 Asset creation using Multichain

IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION

Implementation

The implementation of the proposed system has been carried out within a controlled environment with a web-based application created to serve as the front end application enabling the users to interact in a convenient manner. This application is implemented via Java EE within the Netbeans platform with native Glassfish server used for hosting the application. Glassfish managed server side container for holding the application's EJBs and the data source. The application uses a MySQL as the backend database for the application and contains the data entered manually by an admin such as the voter details, constituency details and the information about different political parties running for the election. An application screenshot demonstrating the admin function to view list of eligible voters is presented in Fig. 2. In addition to manual entries, the application also supports importing data using MS Excel spread sheets to perform bulk import in view of the size of the data in real-world voting scenarios. We have used Multichain as the blockchain platform to create a private blockchain for this application which is used for recording the voting transactions. This choice is influenced by the ease of use provided by this platform and therefore it was easily integrated into our proposed architecture.

Evaluation and Experimentation

The primary objective of evaluation was to assess the performance of the system in view of the e-voting system requirements presented in section 2 and to identify any considerations with regards to its application in a real world scenario. The experimentation consisted of multiple steps i.e. conducting multiple transactions, verification of transactions, mining transactions into blockchain, reflection of the changes made in the public ledger to all the nodes in the network and the usability of the system.

A test run was made directly at Multichain by starting from asset creation. An outcome of this is demonstrated by Fig. 3. We can refer these assets as votes. Since Multichain by default ideally suits to cryptocurrency, therefore we wrote our API's to design it in the context of vote. In order to perform

depth evaluation of approach highlights its effectiveness with respect to achieving fundamental requirements for an e-voting scheme.

In continuation of this work, we are focused at improving the resistance of blockchain technology to ‘double spending’ problem which will translate as ‘double voting’ for e-voting systems. Although blockchain technology achieves significant success in detection of malleable change in a transaction however successful demonstration of such events have been achieved which motivates us to investigate it further. To this end, we believe an effective model to establish trustworthy provenance for e-voting systems will be crucial to achieve an end-to-end verifiable e-voting scheme. The work to achieve this is underway in the form of an additional provenance layer to aid the existing blockchain based infrastructure.

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