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Title: Negative Mood and Obsessive-Compulsive Related Clinical  
Constructs: an Examination of Underlying Factors

Running title: The relationship between clinical constructs

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29 **Abstract**

30 Emerging evidence suggests that many of the clinical constructs used to help understand and  
31 explain obsessive-compulsive (OC) symptoms, and negative mood, may be causally interrelated.  
32 One approach to understanding this interrelatedness is a motivational systems approach. This  
33 approach suggests that rather than considering clinical constructs and negative affect as separable  
34 entities, they are all features of an integrated threat management system, and as such are highly  
35 coordinated and interdependent. The aim of the present study was to examine if clinical  
36 constructs related to OC symptoms and negative mood are best treated as separable or,  
37 alternatively, if these clinical constructs and negative mood are best seen as indicators of an  
38 underlying superordinate variable, as would be predicted by a motivational systems approach. A  
39 sample of 370 student participants completed measures of mood and the clinical constructs of  
40 inflated responsibility, intolerance of uncertainty (IU), not just right experiences (NJREs) and  
41 checking stop rules. An exploratory factor analysis suggested two plausible factor structures, one  
42 where all construct items and negative mood items loaded onto one underlying superordinate  
43 variable, and a second structure comprising of 5 factors, where each item loaded onto a factor  
44 representative of what the item was originally intended to measure. A confirmatory factor  
45 analysis showed that the five factor model was preferential to the one factor model, suggesting  
46 the four constructs and negative mood are best conceptualised as separate variables. Given the  
47 predictions of a motivational systems approach were not supported in the current study, other  
48 possible explanations for the causal interrelatedness between clinical constructs and negative  
49 mood are discussed.

50

51 *Key words:* Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder; Inflated Responsibility; Intolerance of Uncertainty;  
52 Not Just Right Experiences; Checking Stop Rules; Negative Mood.

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65 **1: Introduction**

66 A number of clinical constructs have been identified and causally linked to obsessive-  
67 compulsive (OC) symptoms (Davey, 2003). These constructs aim to capture the beliefs, attitudes  
68 and thought patterns associated with OC symptoms, and examples of such constructs include  
69 intolerance of uncertainty (IU; Beech & Liddell, 1974) and inflated responsibility (Salkovskis,  
70 1985). In addition to the aforementioned clinical constructs, negative mood has also been  
71 casually linked to OC symptoms. For example, Salkovskis and Freeston (2001) proposed that  
72 negative mood may increase the occurrence of intrusive thoughts, increase the accessibility of  
73 negative assumptions, increase the likelihood of inadequate appraisals and decrease the efficacy  
74 of dismissal, suppression, and other neutralising strategies. Whilst on occasion two or more of  
75 these clinical constructs maybe connected together in a causal model (see e.g., Lind & Boschen  
76 2009) more often these constructs are treated as separable and as having separable causal effects  
77 on OC symptoms. The aim of the present study is to examine if clinical constructs related to OC  
78 symptoms and negative mood are best treated as separable or, alternatively, if these clinical  
79 constructs and negative mood are best seen as indicators of an underlying superordinate variable  
80 or variables.

81

82 Consistent with the idea that constructs are separable, constructs are usually measured  
83 using separate inventories or sub-scales (see e.g., Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working  
84 Group [OCCWG], 1997) and constructs have been manipulated independently of one another to  
85 examine their effect on OC symptoms (e.g., Ladouceur et al. 1995). Most theories are silent on  
86 any potential relationship between constructs or explicitly state they believe constructs to be  
87 separable (e.g. Summerfeldt 2004, 2007) and, when constructs are examined together within a  
88 single study, they are usually placed head to head against one another to see which construct  
89 “best” predicts OC symptoms (e.g., Steketee et al., 1998) - an approach which emphasizes the  
90 supposed separable nature of the constructs and the differences, as opposed to the similarities,  
91 between them. This approach is often taken in studies even when the relevant constructs have  
92 been shown to be at least moderately correlated with one another within the same study (e.g.,  
93 Steketee et al., 1998).

94

95 However, emerging research suggests that constructs may interact to increase OC  
96 symptoms and that constructs themselves may be causally interrelated. For example, using a  
97 mediation model, Lind and Boschen (2009) found that the relationship between inflated  
98 responsibility and checking was fully mediated by IU. In a series of three experiments that  
99 explored the causal relationships between inflated responsibility, IU and negative mood, Britton  
100 and Davey (2014) found that all three constructs were causally interrelated. Similarly, Dash and  
101 Davey (2012) found that manipulating negative mood casually affected the deployment of as-  
102 many-as-can (AMAC) stop rules, whilst Britton (2011) found that manipulating inflated  
103 responsibility increases the intensity of “not just right experiences” (NJRE).

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105 Britton and Davey (2014) interpreted their results within a motivational systems  
106 approach. In this approach emotions such as anxiety are seen as features of a ‘precautionary  
107 system’ that simultaneously alerts the individual to challenges and threats to goals, and  
108 coordinates cognitive and behavioural reactions in order that the individual can respond more  
109 effectively to these challenges and threats. Individual threat management systems such as this  
110 will be characterised by a functional coherence in which perceptual, affective, cognitive and  
111 behavioral processes work together to reduce the fitness costs of potential threats (e.g., Frijda  
112 1986; Keltner et al., 2006). As perceptual, affective, cognitive and behavioral elements are all  
113 part of an integrated evolved functional system, we would expect these elements to be highly  
114 coordinated and interdependent, with the affective experience being an emerging property of the  
115 activation of the various functional elements in the system (Neuberg et al., 2011; Kendrick &  
116 Shiota, 2008). Britton and Davey (2014) argued that if disorders such as OC disorder (OCD) are  
117 fundamentally derived from anxiety as an adaptive emotion then one implication of the  
118 motivational systems view is that emotional, cognitive and behavioral elements characteristic of  
119 anxiety should be coordinated and interdependent within the threat management system relevant  
120 to anxiety, and the integrated nature of the relationships between negative mood and constructs  
121 such as inflated responsibility and IU are supportive of such a view. Rather than one set of  
122 factors (e.g., constructs) being causes of a different set of factors (e.g., affect), they are all  
123 integrated components of an anxiety precautionary system that promotes a ‘cascade’ of relevant  
124 perceptions, cognitions, behaviors and affective experience conducive to solving the adaptive  
125 problem (Kenrick et al., 2010).

126

127 The primary purpose of this paper is to further examine the underlying relationship  
128 between 4 constructs related to OC disorder and negative mood. Specifically, the primary aim of  
129 the current study was to examine if these clinical constructs and negative mood are separable or  
130 if they are indicators of a single superordinate variable, as would be suggested by a motivational  
131 system approach, or, alternatively, if they are indicative of a different number of underlying  
132 variables. Due to the large number of clinical constructs linked to OCD within the literature, the  
133 authors’ chose to include only those constructs which have been shown to be casually related to  
134 each other and/or with negative mood within the literature.

135

136 In addition to negative mood, the clinical constructs IU and inflated responsibility were  
137 measured in the current study as evidence suggests they have bidirectional relationships with  
138 both negative mood and with each other (Britton & Davey, 2014). *IU* is defined as a  
139 “dispositional characteristic that arises from a set of negative beliefs about uncertainty and its  
140 connotations and consequences” (Birrell et al., 2011, p.1200) and is underpinned by appraisals  
141 such as ‘uncertainty is dangerous’, ‘uncertainty is intolerable’ and ‘I can’t deal with uncertainty’  
142 (Koerner & Dugas, 2006). *Inflated responsibility* is defined as the belief that one has the power  
143 to bring about or prevent subjectively crucial negative outcomes (Salkovskis, 1985; Rachman,  
144 1998).

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146 Two further constructs were also measured in the current study as evidence suggests that  
147 they are causally facilitated by negative mood, IU or inflated responsibility (Dash & Davey,  
148 2012; Britton, 2011) and therefore these constructs may potentially be coordinated and  
149 interdependent within any relevant threat management system. *NJREs* can be defined as, “the  
150 subjective sense that something isn’t just as it should be”, an unsettled feeling due to something  
151 in the individual or in the world around them not being right (Coles et al., 2003). The final  
152 construct focused on in this paper is “as many as can” (*AMAC*) goal-directed stop rules for  
153 checking. Stop rules can be best explained by linking them to task motivation. Broadly, two  
154 specific types of task motivation have been proposed, performance focused motivation and task  
155 focused motivation (Vaughn et al., 2006). A performance motivated individual who engages in a  
156 task will be focused on meeting a certain standard or criteria whilst engaged in that task. The  
157 person motivated in this way is likely to continue with the task until they have met their given  
158 standard or criteria for that task (e.g. Hirt et al., 1996). In contrast, a task motivated individual  
159 who engages in a task will do so without concern about evaluation or without any particular  
160 performance standards for the task. A person using *AMAC* stop rules whilst engaged in a task  
161 (such as checking or worrying) is analogous to someone using performance focused motivation,  
162 the individual’s *AMAC* stop rule for that task will encourage them to continue with the task until  
163 they are sure they have met whatever their specific criteria or standard was for that task.

164

165 It is of note that all four constructs measured in the current study have been shown to  
166 have a causal effect on OC symptoms (Ladouceur et al., 1995; Toffolo et al., 2013; Coles et al.,  
167 2005; MacDonald & Davey, 2005) and each have also been linked to anxiety related symptoms  
168 (Startup & Davey, 2003; Ladouceur et al., 2000; Coles et al., 2003) making an exploration of the  
169 relatedness of these constructs also of relevance to anxiety disorders. In summary, the primary  
170 aim of the current study is to explore the underlying relationships between negative mood and 4  
171 OC symptom related constructs which recent evidence suggest are causally interrelated. A threat  
172 management system approach would suggest that each construct and negative mood would be  
173 best depicted as an indicator of a single superordinate variable whilst, if constructs and negative  
174 mood are separable, we would predict that a 5 factor model would be the best depiction of these  
175 relationships, with each of the 4 constructs and negative mood, respectively, represented by a  
176 single factor. Plausible arguments could be made for other factor solutions. For example,  
177 Summerfeldt’s (2004, 2007) model of OCD proposes two core, continuous, orthogonal  
178 dimensions to explain the motivational processes important to the development and maintenance  
179 of OCD: harm avoidance (as characterised by inflated responsibility) and incompleteness (as  
180 characterised by *NJRE*). This model would suggest that *NJRE* and inflated responsibility should  
181 be represented by two separate factors. However, it would be difficult to predict based on this  
182 model if negative mood, for example, should load onto either of these two factors or a separate  
183 factor.

184

185 In order to explore the factor structure underlying the four constructs and negative mood  
186 an exploratory factor analysis was first carried out in order to ascertain possible factor structures  
187 underlying the relationships between the 4 measured constructs and negative mood. Any  
188 emerging plausible models based on the findings of this exploratory factor analysis were then  
189 directly compared with one another using confirmatory factor analysis.

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### 191 **2: Method**

#### 192 **2.1: Participants**

193 A questionnaire booklet was completed by a student sample of 370 participants (male:  
194 74; female: 296). Ages ranged from 17 to 74 years ( $M = 27.38$ ,  $SD = 11.96$ ). 48.3% of the  
195 sample in the current study consisted of psychology undergraduates at the University of Sussex  
196 who received partial fulfilment of a course requirement by taking part in the study. The remainder  
197 of the sample represent other students, university staff and university visitors who volunteered to  
198 fill in the questionnaire after being initially approached by the researcher. This latter groups of  
199 participants received the gratitude of the researcher for participation but were not financially  
200 rewarded.

201

#### 202 **2.2: Procedure**

203 Participants were provided with questionnaire-batteries, with every second questionnaire  
204 package reverse ordered. Participants were asked to supply some very basic demographic  
205 information and to provide informed consent before completing the questionnaire.

206

207 This study was carried out in accordance with the recommendations of British  
208 Psychological Society with written informed consent from all subjects. All subjects gave written  
209 informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. The protocol was approved by  
210 the ethics committee at the University of Sussex.

211

#### 212 **2.3: Measures**

213 IU was measured using the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS, Freeston et al., 1994),  
214 which was designed to measure an individual's IU, particularly the ideas that uncertainty is  
215 unacceptable, reflects badly on a person, leads to frustration and stress, and leads to the inability  
216 to take action. The IUS has demonstrated excellent internal consistency ( $\alpha = .94$ ), good test–  
217 retest reliability ( $r = .78$ ) and convergent and divergent validity (Buhr & Dugas, 2002). The IUS  
218 had excellent internal consistency in the current study ( $\alpha = .95$ ).

219

220 NJREs were measured using the The Not Just Right Experiences-Questionnaire Revised  
221 (NJRE-QR, Coles et al., 2003) which is composed of 19 items. The first ten items measure how  
222 often NJRE occur. The next two items (items 11 and 12) ask respondents to indicate which  
223 NJRE occurred most recently and when it last occurred (past few hours to past month). The last 7  
224 items in the questionnaire measure the intensity of NJRE. The NJRE-QR produces two total  
225 scores, NJRE occurrence (composite score of NJRE-QR items 1-10) and NJRE intensity  
226 (composite score of NJRE-QR items 13-19). Coles et al., (2003) found good internal consistency

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227 ( $\alpha = .79$ ) for the 10 NJRE occurrence items, and all 19 items showed good convergent and  
228 discriminant validity, evident in stronger correlations with OCD symptoms than with depressive  
229 symptoms, trait anxiety, social anxiety or worry. In the current sample the NJRE occurrence sub-  
230 scale showed acceptable internal consistency ( $\alpha = .74$ ) whilst the NJRE intensity scale showed  
231 excellent internal consistency ( $\alpha = .94$ ).

232

233 Negative mood was measured using the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS,  
234 Watson et al., 1988) which consists of two 10-item mood scales. The first is a measure of  
235 positive affect and lists 10 “positive” emotions and the second is a measure of negative affect  
236 and lists 10 “negative” emotions. Watson et al., (1988) report that both scales have good internal  
237 consistency (reliability of the positive affect scale ranged from  $\alpha = .86$  to  $\alpha = .90$ , the negative  
238 affect scale from  $\alpha = .84$  to  $\alpha = .87$ ). The construct validity of the scale has been supported (see  
239 Crawford & Henry, 2004). In the current sample both the positive affect scale ( $\alpha = .87$ ) and the  
240 negative affect scale ( $\alpha = .88$ ) showed good internal consistency.

241

242 Inflated responsibility was measured using the Responsibility Attitude Scale (RAS;  
243 Salkovskis et al., 2000), a 26-item questionnaire that measures general beliefs related to inflated  
244 responsibility. The internal consistency of the scale is excellent and test–retest reliability is also  
245 excellent ( $r = .94$ , Salkovskis et al., 2000). Several studies attest to the measures convergent  
246 validity (Salkovskis et al., 2000; Yorulmaz et al., 2002). The RAS had excellent internal  
247 consistency in the current study ( $\alpha = .92$ ).

248

249 AMAC checking stop rules were measured using the Checking Stop Rule Questionnaire  
250 (CSRQ, Britton 2011), a 20-item questionnaire where 10 items -measure endorsement of AMAC  
251 stop rules and where 10 -measure endorsement of “feel like continuing” (FLC) stop rules. Britton  
252 (2011) reported that two factors underlie the CSRQ, the first measuring AMAC stop rules and  
253 the second FLC stop rules and that both of these factors are reliable (reliability for AMAC  
254 subscale was  $\alpha = .91$ , reliability for the FLC subscale was  $\alpha = .88$ ). The same study found that  
255 the CSRQ’s two subscales correlate in expected directions with other relevant constructs  
256 providing evidence of the CSRQ’s validity (Britton, 2011). In the present study the AMAC  
257 subscale had excellent internal consistency ( $\alpha = .91$ ) whilst the FLC subscale had very good  
258 internal consistency ( $\alpha = .89$ ).

259

### 260 **3: Results**

#### 261 **3.1: Missing data**

262 There was very little missing data in the sample; overall 99.12% of the total number of  
263 questions were answered across the sample. Therefore, any missing data was imputed by adding  
264 the mean of the relevant question.

265

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### 266 **3.2: Preliminary analysis**

267 A preliminary analysis was conducted to examine the Pearson's correlation between the  
268 total scores (or relevant sub-scale scores) on the questionnaire measures of the four constructs  
269 and negative mood. IU, inflated responsibility, negative mood, AMAC stop rule use and NJRE  
270 occurrence and intensity were all significantly correlated, with correlations ranging from medium  
271 to large in terms of size (correlations ranging from .36 to .69, see table 1). From this preliminary  
272 analysis it is realistic to assume that IU, inflated responsibility, negative mood, AMAC stop rule  
273 use, NJRE occurrence and NJRE intensity all overlap and possibly reflect some underlying  
274 superordinate variable.

275  
276 **Table 1:** Pearson correlation coefficients between the total scores on the 4 clinical constructs and  
277 negative mood.

	IU	Inflated Responsibility	Negative mood	<u>NJRE</u> <u>Occurrence</u>	<u>NJRE</u> <u>Intensity</u>	<u>AMAC</u>
IU	†	.59*	.56*	.48*	.44*	.48*
Inflated Responsibility		†	.42*	.36*	.36*	.48*
Negative mood			†	.37*	.37*	.40*
NJRE Occurrence				†	.69*	.43*
NJRE Intensity					†	.44*
AMAC						†

278 \* $p < .001$ , Two-tailed significance reported.

279

### 280 **3.3: Analytic strategy and treatment of categorical data**

281 In order to explore to explore if the constructs and negative mood are separable or if they  
282 are best seen as indicators of one (or more) superordinate variables, a two-stage approach was  
283 taken. Firstly, an exploratory factor analysis was conducted to provide an indication of how  
284 many factors may underlie the data set. Secondly, plausible factor structures (as suggest by the  
285 exploratory factor analysis) were compared directly using confirmatory factor analysis.

286

287 Items entered into a factor analysis should generally be continuous as opposed to  
288 categorical (Kline, 2005). Within the current study, 10 items were measured on scales with less  
289 than 5 levels. These 10 items are the first ten items of the NJRE-QR. Each of these items ask the  
290 participant to state if they have experienced a specific NJRE within the past month (e.g. I have  
291 had the sensation after getting dressed that parts of my clothes tags, collars, pant legs, etc, didn't  
292 feel just right) and participants are simply asked to offer a yes or no response. Kline (2005)  
293 suggests one way to overcome the problem of categorical items in factor analysis is to parcel  
294 items together, that is to create one or more total scores (linear composites) across a set of two or  
295 more items. These parcels can then be treated as continuous indicators. It was decided to  
296 therefore make two composite variables (both of which would have a range of possible scores  
297 from 0 to 5). The response to NJRE items 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 were combined to make a composite



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298 score, NJRE occurrence 1. In support of the combination of all of these items into one score, all  
299 of the individual items were significantly positively correlated with each other (all correlations  
300 significant at  $p < .001$ ). The responses to NJRE items 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 were combined to make a  
301 second composite score, NJRE occurrence 2. In support of the combination of all of these items  
302 into one score, all of the individual items were significantly positively correlated with each other  
303 (all correlations significant at  $p < .01$ ). With these 10 variables transformed into two composite  
304 scores, all variables in the data set were now measured on a scale with at least 5 levels.

305

### 306 **3.4: Exploratory factor analysis**

307 An exploratory factor analysis was performed on the four constructs and negative mood  
308 to explore the factor structure underlying these variables. All of the 26 items measuring inflated  
309 responsibility (the RAS), the 27 items measuring IU (the IUS), the 10 items measuring AMAC  
310 stop rule use (from the CSRQ) and the 10 items measuring negative mood (from the PANAS)  
311 were examined in the analysis. In addition, the two composite NJRE occurrence variables  
312 described in the previous section and the items in the NJRE-QR measured on separate 7-point  
313 Likert scales (items 13-19) were also examined in the analysis (giving a total of 82 items).

314

315 Communalities ranged from .50 to .84. Fifteen components had eigenvalues over 1:  
316 23.29, 5.02, 4.59, 3.37, 3.15, 1.97, 1.70, 1.54, 1.36, 1.25, 1.20, 1.13, 1.12, 1.07, 1.01. The scree  
317 plot was used to determine the optimum number of factors (as recommended by e.g., Catell,  
318 1966; Field, 2009). The scree plot strongly indicated a one or five factor solution over alternative  
319 factor solutions (e.g., a two factor solution or three factor solution) and so these two possible  
320 factor structures were further explored.

321

322 Firstly, a factor analysis was run extracting one factor. This solution explained 23.29% of  
323 the variance. The internal consistency for this scale was excellent ( $\alpha = .96$ ). Examination of the  
324 factor loadings showed that while most of the items had moderate loadings (.40 or above, Field,  
325 2009) on the one emergent factor, 9 items did not. Of the items which did not load moderately  
326 onto the emergent factor, 7 were from the RAS, one from the CSRQ and one from the PANAS.

327

328 Secondly, a factor analysis was run extracting five factors with varimax rotation (a  
329 varimax rotation was used to aid with interpretation of the emergent factors, however, it is of  
330 note that an oblique rotation was also run which produced a nearly identical factor solution to the  
331 varimax rotation. The results of the oblique rotation are therefore not reported). After rotation the  
332 five emergent factors had eigenvalues of: 12.28, 8.55, 6.65, 6.23 and 5.61. This solution  
333 explained 47.94% of the variance. Looking at the rotated component matrix the resulting scale  
334 produced 5 reliable subscales each separately measuring each of the original 5 constructs; IU,  
335 inflated responsibility, negative mood, NJRE, AMAC stop rules (see table 2 for internal  
336 consistency, means and standard deviations on the five scales and correlations between factors).  
337 Of note is the fact that *all* of the items thought to measure a particular construct loaded most  
338 strongly onto the factor thought to represent that construct.

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340 **Table 2.** Descriptive statistics for the 5 constructs and correlations between factors (n = 370).

	Internal Consistency	Mean (SD)	2	3	4	5
1. AMAC	$\alpha = .91$	2.46 (.90)	.48*	.48*	.44*	.40*
2. Inflated responsibility	$\alpha = .92$	3.60 (.91)		.60*	.37*	.41*
3. IU	$\alpha = .95$	1.98 (.71)			.47*	.55*
4. NJRE	$\alpha = .91$	4.72 (3.64)				.39*
5. Negative Mood	$\alpha = .89$	2.59 (.81)				

341 Note: \*  $p < .001$ . Two-tailed significance reported.

342

343 **3.5: Confirmatory factor analysis**

344 A confirmatory factor analysis was performed to directly compare the five factor model  
345 and the one factor model.

346

347 The one factor model was specified so that all items loaded directly onto one factor. In  
348 the five factor model items were specified to load onto only one of five factors according to the  
349 pattern indicated by the five factor solution (i.e. all IU items loading only onto factor 1, or the IU  
350 factor, all RAS items loading only onto factor 2, or the inflated responsibility factor, all negative  
351 mood PANAS items load only onto factor 3, or the negative mood factor, all NJRE-QR factors  
352 loading only onto factor 4, or the NJRE factor, all AMAC CSRQ items loading only onto factor  
353 5, or the AMAC factor). In the model all five factors were specified to correlate with one another  
354 (as is suggested in table 2).

355

356 This analysis showed the five factor model is a significantly better fit than the one factor  
357 model,  $\Delta\chi^2(10) = 4840, p < .001$ . The five factor solution is therefore preferred over the one  
358 factor solution.

359

360 It should be noted that neither the one factor nor the five factor model were an especially  
361 good fit to the data using many conventional fit indices, although observation of these indices  
362 support the findings of the chi-square test, suggesting that the five factor model is a better fit to  
363 the data than the one factor model. The reason for such poor fit, in relation to both models, is

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364 because a large number of significant pathways were not specified in the models as doing so  
365 would have compromised the point of the analysis: to test the relative fit of a one factor vs five  
366 factor model. A list of the significant pathways not added to the models by type are: correlations  
367 between error terms, correlations between items, correlations between error terms and items (five  
368 factor model only), correlations between error terms and latent variables (five factor model only)  
369 and correlations between items and latent variables (five factor model only). Values for selected  
370 fit indices for the one factor model are: CFI = .51, RMR = .22, RMSEA = .08 with 90%  
371 confidence interval .08-.09. Values for selected fit indices for the five factor model are: CFI =  
372 .79, RMR = .12, RMSEA = .06 with 90% confidence interval .05-.06.

373

### 374 **4: Discussion**

375 The analyses reported in this paper demonstrate that inflated responsibility, IU, NJRE,  
376 AMAC stop rules and negative mood are best seen as five separate variables rather than as  
377 indicators of an underlying superordinate variable or variables. The exploratory factor analysis  
378 suggested two plausible factor structures, one where all construct items and negative mood items  
379 loaded onto one underlying superordinate variable, and a second structure comprising of 5  
380 factors, where each item loaded onto a factor representative of what the item was originally  
381 intended to measure (i.e. all IU items loading only onto factor 1, or the IU factor, all RAS items  
382 loading only onto factor 2, or the inflated responsibility factor etc). A confirmatory factor  
383 analysis showed that the five factor model was preferential to the one factor model, suggesting  
384 the four constructs and negative mood are best conceptualised as separate variables.

385

386 The results of the present study are therefore not supportive of a motivational systems  
387 approach in relation to explaining the relationships between constructs related to OC symptoms  
388 and negative mood (Britton & Davey, 2014). Such an approach would suggest that, as the  
389 constructs measured and negative mood are highly coordinated and interdependent within the  
390 relevant threat management system, they should all load onto one superordinate variable  
391 representative of that threat management system. Rather, the results of the present study suggest  
392 the four constructs and negative mood are separable and therefore support the fact that each of  
393 the clinical constructs are generally discussed, measured and manipulated separately from each  
394 other within the OCD literature. The results are also supportive of those theories which suggest  
395 that the constructs are separable, for example, Summerfeldt's (2004, 2007) model of OCD which  
396 proposes two dimensions to explain the motivational processes important to the development and  
397 maintenance of OCD: harm avoidance (as characterised by inflated responsibility) and  
398 incompleteness (as characterised by NJRE). In addition, the results of the present study are  
399 supportive of those theories which suggest that clinical constructs and negative mood are  
400 separable, for example, Salkovskis et al's (2000) model which suggests that inflated  
401 responsibility and negative mood are separate but causally interrelated variables which both  
402 increase the occurrence of intrusive thoughts. Cognitive treatments for OCD and anxiety  
403 disorders are often based on addressing the types of clinical constructs measured in the current  
404 paper (e.g., inflated responsibility, Kohlenberg & Vandenbergh, 2007; IU, Dugas & Ladouceur,  
405 2000). The results of the present study support the idea that it possible to separately address the  
406 clinical constructs measured in the current study in the treatment of OCD and anxiety disorders.

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408 The finding that the constructs measured and negative mood seem to be separable rather  
409 than indicators of a core underlying variable raises a question: how do we explain bidirectional  
410 causal relationships between negative mood with constructs related to OC symptoms, and the  
411 bidirectional relationship between constructs themselves (e.g., Britton & Davey, 2014), if they  
412 are not indicators of one superordinate variable?  
413

414 One possibility is that although constructs related to OC symptoms and negative mood  
415 are unique and separable entities they are entities which to some extent overlap with one another,  
416 as indicated by the fact that all four constructs measured in the current study and negative mood  
417 appear to correlate moderately with one another. As such, the manipulation of one construct or  
418 negative mood will have a causal influence on other constructs measured (or negative mood),  
419 due to the overlapping relationship between the relevant constructs and negative mood.

420

421 Another possibility is that that while constructs related to OC symptoms and negative  
422 mood represent unique and separable entities, they are all connected to a third variable which  
423 mediates the relationship between them. One potential candidate for mediating the relationship  
424 between inflated responsibility, IU and negative mood (Britton & Davey, 2014) is that all three  
425 constructs affect information processing style, and in particular trigger systematic processing of  
426 information. Systematic processing is a bottom-up, data-driven and comprehensively analytic  
427 style in which perceivers access and scrutinize all informational input for its relevance and  
428 importance to their judgement, and integrate all information in forming their judgement (Chaiken  
429 et al., 1989). Negative mood has been shown experimentally to facilitate systematic processing  
430 (Ambady & Gray, 2002; Batra & Stayman, 1990; Tiedens & Linton, 2001) as have a range of  
431 situational and dispositional factors including responsibility, accountability, desire for control,  
432 personal relevance and task importance (Chaiken et al., 1989; Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991;  
433 Lee et al., 1999; Ambady & Gray, 2002; Batra & Stayman, 1990; Tiedens & Linton, 2001;  
434 Sorrentino et al., 1988) and many of these factors are likely to be enhanced by feelings of  
435 inflated responsibility and IU. For example, feelings of IU have been linked to increases in desire  
436 for control (Krohne, 1993) whilst increases in inflated responsibility are likely to lead to an  
437 increased sense of task importance (Salkovskis, 1985). Negative mood in particular provides  
438 information that characterises a situation as problematic and fosters the spontaneous adoption of  
439 a systematic, detail-oriented, bottom-up processing style (Schwarz, 1990). Increasing feelings of  
440 responsibility will also signal a situation as problematic and foster systematic processing  
441 (Chaiken et al., 1989) – but only if the outcomes for which the individual feels responsible are  
442 appraised as having potentially harmful or threatening outcomes, a characteristic typical of the  
443 OC explanatory construct of inflated responsibility (Salkovskis, 1985). An increase in IU will  
444 increase the desire for control (Krohne, 1993) and this in turn will also foster systematic  
445 processing (Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991). Thus, inflated responsibility, IU and negative mood  
446 are all factors that potentially have an integrated relationship with a specific information  
447 processing style which may explain the bidirectional causal relationships between them.  
448 Activation of that common processing style through increases in inflated responsibility, IU or  
449 negative mood, respectively, is likely to lead to an increase in scores on the other two constructs,  
450 as all three constructs are associated with increases in systematic processing. It is also of note  
451 that those individuals with OCD and OC tendencies use a more controlled information

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452 processing style, even under conditions that non-OCD participants use a speed-oriented  
453 information processing style (Soref et al., 2008; Kalanthroff et al., 2014).

454

455 Whilst the four constructs measured in the current study and negative mood appear to be  
456 separate variables, the fact that one factor explained a good deal of shared variance between the  
457 four constructs and negative mood in the exploratory factor analysis is of note. Whilst this factor  
458 may have simply been artifact of shared method variance, it is possible it maybe representative  
459 of a core genetic/biological deficit underlying OC symptoms (e.g., Maia et al., 2008) or anxiety  
460 related problems more generally (e.g., Norrholm & Ressler, 2009).

461

462 Finally, the present study has a number of limitations. First, given a primarily student  
463 sample was used in the present study, it is not clear how generalisable the conclusions of this  
464 study are to a clinical population. It should be noted that taxometric studies have suggested that  
465 OC related symptoms are generally best considered as dimensional rather than categorical (e.g.,  
466 Haslam et al., 2005) and many cognitive models of OC symptoms follow a dimensional model  
467 (e.g., Frost & Steketee, 2002) supporting the appropriateness of studying OC related phenomena  
468 in student samples. However, the validity of the results presented in this paper would be  
469 strengthened if they were replicated within a clinical sample. Second, the present study measured  
470 only 4 constructs, and negative mood, and as such did not measure a number of other constructs  
471 that have been linked to OC symptoms (e.g., thought-action fusion, Rachman, 1993). Whilst this  
472 was done as we wished to include only those constructs which have been connected causally  
473 through experimental manipulation, it should be noted that the inclusion of other constructs may  
474 have led to a different factor structure emerging in the current study. A related limitation of the  
475 present study is that OC symptoms and anxiety symptoms which have been linked to the  
476 constructs measured in the current study (e.g., worry) were also not measured. Again, the  
477 inclusion of OC symptoms and symptoms related to other disorders may have led to a different  
478 factor structure emerging in the current study. Finally, only self-report measures were used in the  
479 current study. Whilst noting the limitations associated with self-report measures, the authors'  
480 would comment that the constructs measured in the current study are almost exclusively  
481 measured by self-report in the wider OC literature, and so measurement of these constructs in  
482 this study is consistent with other research in this field.

483

### 484 **Conflict of Interest Statement**

485 The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or  
486 financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

487

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