**Chapter 2**

**Feldenkrais, Freud, Lacan and Gould:**

**How to Love thyself for thy Neighbour**

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**I Introduction**

“I myself, I owe to Freud three tenths of my knowledge or more, three quarters of what I know, and what I am talking [about] now.”[[1]](#footnote-1)

The importance of psychoanalysis in the formation of Mosche Feldenkrais’s thinking is rarely discussed in the literature on this somatic thinker. One of Freud’s interests was in slips of the tongue and jokes.[[2]](#footnote-2) For Freud, such off-the-cuff statements reveal an unbidden truth, and an intention or desire to say something that should perhaps have remained unspoken, but that needed to be revealed. In a more Feldenkraisian sense, they reveal something of ourselves of which we are unaware. Feldenkrais’s admission above occurs in the context of a discussion of fears and habit. He advises his student audience that if they want to change there is no point in going to a desert island to escape the world; the important thing is the way in which the quality of the nervous system can be improved through engagement with the world and, crucially with the self through movement. It is essential that “intention can be organized properly” through a form of somatic kindness to the self in action which facilitates comfort as a primary condition for learning. For Feldenkrais, we need to find out *how* we do something, which parts of ourselves participate in our actions, and at the foundation of this, as the singer Leontyne Price (1927- ) explains beautifully, is a form of self-love in action.[[3]](#footnote-3) These are vital lessons for daily artistic practice. In the introduction to *The Potent Self*, Feldenkrais discusses Christ’s Commandment: “Love thy Neighbour as thyself” (Matthew 22:39, Luke 10:27). He provides a unique qualification of this injunction: “Love Thyself as Thy Neighbour.”[[4]](#footnote-4) This chapter differentiates Feldenkrais’s thought on Christ’s injunction from Freud’s thinking this presented in *Civilization and its Discontents* (1930), and further connects this to Jacques Lacan’s (1901-81) thought. [[5]](#footnote-5) I am not attempting to imply Lacan’s influence on Feldenkrais, but to point towards some of the remarkable synergies that exist between their thought. While Freud is openly hostile on a number of counts to Christ’s injunction, Feldenkrais’s response is more constructive. The individual must learn to love themselves first – in a Freudian reading, to overcome the innate aggression within the individual – so that they can then be a useful member of civilization, and be fully enabled to help others. Lacan takes Freud’s ideas further. In the neighbour resides what he calls *das Ding* (the “Thing”), the quality not merely of otherness, but of something alien that reminds one reflexively of this “Thing” in oneself. Feldenkrais’s Method, I argue, provides a safe and sanitised access to this “Thing,” which is associated with personal and artistic uniqueness essential to creativity in this chapter.[[6]](#footnote-6) Awareness of the how one writes, or plays an instrument and what participates in this action, provides a means to artistic improvement. I discuss this uniqueness with reference to the Canadian pianist Glenn Gould (1932-82). It is plausible that Gould withdrew from performance in 1964 to avoid the collective “Things,” of the public. Many performers, it could be argued, require the trauma of the “Thing,” and the gratification that comes from flaunting it through applause and critical plaudits. But at the same time, performance, on stage and at a safe distance from the unique qualities of people, also arguably protects the performer others. For Gould, performance and communication with his neighbour (understood as the listening public) was to be refreighted in a different form.[[7]](#footnote-7) Paul Meyers, one of Gould’s record producers at Columbia, said that “one of his reasons for his decision to quit the concert stage was that he was tired of being regarded as a “freak show”,” and in an interview with Alex Trebek in 1966, Gould stated how much he “detests audiences.”[[8]](#footnote-8) In a psychoanalytical reading of this interview, the audience here becomes a form of fetishistic absent ‘object’, what Lacan would refer to as *objet petit a* which acts as a detached source of *jouissance* (surplus enjoyment) that escapes symbolisation, or a phantasmatic framework that allows a pay-off for Gould that results from a “failure to integrate it into [his] universe.”[[9]](#footnote-9) Gould’s turn to recording was arguably a way to counter the impermanence of performance and to ground his enjoyment of his uniqueness in a seemingly inviolable product. But it also functions psychoanalytically as a means to satisfy his own needs in default of, but ultimately for the benefit of his neighbour.[[10]](#footnote-10) By withdrawing from the public to focus on recording, Gould made an intelligent decision to make them into a better prosthesis of himself.[[11]](#footnote-11) Through this action, he comes to use more of himself and to use himself more effectively. In Feldenkraisian terms, recording was a pursuit of a form of health: “of realizing his unavowed dreams.”[[12]](#footnote-12) The second part of this chapter brings the work of Feldenkrais, Freud, Lacan, and Gould into conversation. Despite the presence in this study of psychiatric literature, there is no attempt to diagnose or pathologize Gould, nor is there much here on Gould’s “performance mechanism,” as the musicologist Arved Ashby calls it, but to think through what might lie behind his “decision.”[[13]](#footnote-13) In the Feldenkrais Method, part of the process of awareness is becoming cognisant of one’s own parasitic movement - Feldenkrais’s term for cross-motivational activity. In this sense the parasitic functions as part of what Freud calls “resistance.”[[14]](#footnote-14) This process of self-negotiation is connected to Gould’s choice, and this provides a means of understanding compulsiveness and spontaneity in action. The third part of the essay further examines the Gould’s ideas of recording with reference to psychoanalysis and Feldenkrais’s thought, and seeks to understand how he figured his uniqueness, a discussion developed through ethnographical evidence. The final part of this chapter turns to the value of uniqueness for current artistic education and performance training. An addendum provides some practical suggestions for developing this quality in the context of the Feldenkrais Method.

**II Negotiating the Neighbour - Finding Self-Love**

A reader familiar with Feldenkrais’s thought will find many synergies with Freud’s *Civilization and its Discontents.* Early in this book, Freud writes: “Normally, there is nothing of which we are more certain than the feeling of ourself, of our own ego.”[[15]](#footnote-15) Essential to Freud’s project, as it is to Feldenkrais’s own work, is to show that this sense of ourselves is misleading. One of the fundamental purposes of psychoanalysis is figure and ameliorate the gap between the sense of ourselves and our sense or imagination of the way others or society (“civilization”) perceive us. In a similar vein, Feldenkrais’s lessons are designed to remedy a disparity between what we think we are doing and what we are actually doing which Feldenkrais defines as our “self-image.” In music or dance lessons, the student comes to the session with a certain self-image and discovers new perspectives on their self-image; they find new possibilities of using themselves through anothers’ purview. Learning how to understand this gap is fundamental to creative practice and development.[[16]](#footnote-16) It is also essential to the art of recording, and I would contend that Gould’s turn to recording and his search for an ideal form of interpretation is also an attempt to close this gap. To do this is, for Feldenkrais, a perfecting of the self-image, a process of improvement that he understands as unending.[[17]](#footnote-17) Freud speaks of learning and development based on “the pleasure principle.” His thought resonates with Feldenkrais’s ideal that the integration of learning only happens when learning is pleasurable.[[18]](#footnote-18) This again is another reason that Gould I believe turns to recording; the space between the learning process and the execution of this learning become closer in his use of this environment, which evidently provided more satisfaction for Gould than the repetition of concert life.[[19]](#footnote-19) Freud then turns to religion as a critical hinge to understand the origins of happiness and suffering. He cautions that: “An unrestricted satisfaction of every need presents itself as the most enticing method of conducting one’s life, but it means putting enjoyment before caution, and soon brings in its own punishment.”[[20]](#footnote-20) Instead, he advises the path of “becoming a member of the human community,” and in words that pre-empt Feldenkrais’s project, he states: “But the most interesting methods of averting suffering are those which seek to influence our own organism.”[[21]](#footnote-21) Feldenkrais takes this issue up in many ways in his teaching, not least commenting in his New York Quest workshops on how people do not know how to be comfortable in themselves. This again is another reason, I would contend, that Gould turns aside from concert life: his “negative attitude towards audiences” cultivating, as Gould puts it himself “an attitude of healthy indifference,” was surely not comfortable and sustainable.[[22]](#footnote-22) Feldenkrais’s thought here resonates as a salient alternative to Freud’s. Freud suggests that people search for happiness sometimes through intoxication, the sublimation of suffering through work, through a “delusional remoulding of reality,” and what he calls “the economics of the individual’s libido.”[[23]](#footnote-23) Freud then unveils a revelation then that the threat to civilization comes not so much from the feebleness of the human body, nor the inadequate regulations of family life, but from within civilization itself, and in particular from within the individuals within it.[[24]](#footnote-24) Civilization for Freud imposes restrictions on the ability of individuals to be unique in order to preserve itself; this is a concept that I will discuss later in terms of Gould’s recordings through which, I argue, he finds a way of turning against his ‘community’ (both the concert public and certain pianistic axioms) to reinvent it.[[25]](#footnote-25) “The urge for freedom, therefore,” writes Freud, “is directed against particular forms and demands of civilization or against civilization altogether.”[[26]](#footnote-26) “Civilization,” continues Freud, “is built upon a renunciation of instinct,” that presupposes a “non-satisfaction (by suppression, repression or some other means) of powerful instincts.”[[27]](#footnote-27) Feldenkrais extends this when he notes that “the best intentions when acted [on] compulsively [especially a compulsion founded on instinct] yield opposite results,” and he carries the ideal of passive aggression forward by showing that loving one’s neighbour to the exclusion of the self, quashes spontaneity. “Compulsive kindness or goodness of this sort,” he states “is the symptom and the result of inhibited aggression.”[[28]](#footnote-28) Gould’s decision not to obey the super-ego demands of performance culture - to prove oneself continually through concertizing - needs to be understood in this light: he found other ways, through recording, to create “goodness.” Freud affirms the role of love in the relation of civilization before turning to Christ’s injunction, which he finds both surprising and bewildering. He cannot accept this unconditional position for a number of reasons. Firstly, if he truly values his own love, care should be taken in bestowing it. Secondly, there is the value and worthiness of the individual who is potentially to be loved. Thirdly, there seems little point in loving someone when that love is either ignored or not reciprocated in at least equal measure, and finally, he sees it as useless to love a neighbour who may be my enemy. Instead Freud offers this alternative injunction; “Love thy neighbour as thy neighbour loves thee.”[[29]](#footnote-29) In short, he states, Christ’s injunction “runs so strongly counter to the original [instinctual] nature of man,”[[30]](#footnote-30) which, after the death drive, are the “instinct(s) of aggressiveness and destruction.”[[31]](#footnote-31) Feldenkrais understands this relation to aggressiveness in a different light. Aggressiveness is not mitigated through “libidinal sublimation,” but is a *behaviour* that relates to “the amount of confidence the person has gained through exercising the function in which she is impotent.”[[32]](#footnote-32) In his San Francisco Workshops, Feldenkrais stated that:

What is important is that you get the person to love himself, not just like himself. If you achieve that, you are worth your weight in diamonds. If you take a person who hates himself, has no confidence, and make him feel that he can love himself. He feels he can begin to rely on his own self and begins to have self-confidence enough to stand on his feet. Well, who can do that? No politician, no millionaire can. You can’t buy that for money. Yet, you may be able to do it and that means that you are richer than any of those.[[33]](#footnote-33)

It is clear from this that Feldenkrais regarded the individual’s dissatisfaction with themselves, as he also makes clear in *The Potent Self*, and the individual’s tendency to overcome inability through willpower to gain a “disproportionate pleasure when he lives up to his expectations,” to be fundamental impasses that can be ameliorated through his Method.[[34]](#footnote-34) Gould’s decision to leave the concert platform is often explained by him as a profound sense of dissatisfaction with the contingency of live performance, but it should be understood more properly as a dissatisfaction with himself and his own agency in this ecology. Recording was a way of creating self-reliance, and of standing “on his [own] feet,” as Feldenkrais puts it.[[35]](#footnote-35) For Freud, dissatisfaction was conceived of as “the sense of guilt” which is “the most important problem in the development of civilization.” He states that “the price we pay for our advance in civilization is a loss of happiness through the heightening of the sense of guilt.”[[36]](#footnote-36) Feldenkrais puts this in more devastating ways in *The Potent Self*; the price of effort is a loss of human dignity and choice, and the effort to overcome it is something that our civilization is there to sustain. This is very difficult to avoid or unlearn.[[37]](#footnote-37) Gould’s decision therefore to step outside his community can be understood as a brave move that obviated the continual pleasing of his community. For a performer, trained to perform to and for the public, this would be no easy decision. For Feldenkrais the desire and effort to achieve (despite any satisfaction) comes from a feeling, institutionalized by education, that we are not good enough. Effort is required to achieve what is demanded perhaps by the (absent) parent, the teacher or the superego demands of society or the self. Feldenkrais observes the result of this lack of love for the self in the following devastating way: “Reluctantly, most people work themselves into snug little corners, to fit their clipped wings.”[[38]](#footnote-38) Those who reject “stereotyped behaviour” then become the yardstick “who are used to muzzle the next generation.”[[39]](#footnote-39) Gould, for many of his pianistic colleagues, as we shall see, becomes, in different senses, a yardstick. His particular form of uniqueness (originality and eccentricity) becomes an exemplar of what *not* to imitate, and this image of Gould has arguably muzzled similar maverick-style forms of experimentation. For Freud, however, the problem of uniqueness is defined in measuring ourselves against figures such as Christ. This manifests itself in what he calls the “cultural super ego” and its demand to “love thy neighbour.”[[40]](#footnote-40) Although he does not put it this directly, Freud sees civilization as a means of economizing this concept: partially fulfilling it, or fulfilling it enough to substantiate its survival.[[41]](#footnote-41) He describes aggressiveness as a “potent obstacle” to it, but he also inadvertently creates an argument where civilization in fact needs to economize this aggressiveness or protect itself against aggressiveness by exclusion of groups of people from civilization, in order to promote and maintain its ideal of happiness.[[42]](#footnote-42) I now want to develop this understanding of aggressiveness through Lacan’s development of Freud’s work, and to understand this in relation to Feldenkrais’s thought. In his *Seminar VII* (1958-60), in a development of Freud’s thought, Lacan imagines what he calls “the Thing” (*das Ding*), a completely alien and intrusive foreignness that is present in ourselves.[[43]](#footnote-43) The Lacanian theorist Kenneth Reinhard identifies the “Thing” as the kernel of traumatic enjoyment or *jouissance* that is articulated through the neighbour, and that then conditions our awareness of the uncanniness of social relations.[[44]](#footnote-44)In *Seminar VII*, Lacan developed the antagonism between pleasure and *jouissance*. *Jouissance* is understood as an excessive, surplus meaning or excitation, which the pleasure principle (linked to the death drive) attempts to disrupt or traumatise.[[45]](#footnote-45) *Jouissance* is associated with pleasure that occurs through pain. This uncanniness and enjoyment is signalled for example by Elizabeth Bennett’s father (Mr Bennett) in Jane Austen’s *Pride and Prejudice* (1813) when he states: **“**For what do we live, but to make sport for our neighbours, and laugh at them in our turn?”[[46]](#footnote-46) Mr Bennett’s wry and genteel observation is a screen for the aggressiveness that is held at bay and that prevents his full *jouissance* (in a Freudian sense, through a repressed desire to kill his neighbour). Lacan argues that our ‘happiness’ is a screen against *jouissance*, and that the more we give up *jouissance*, the more we punish ourselves (this is what Mr. Bennett does to himself).[[47]](#footnote-47) This is very similar to Feldenkrais’s argument that in becoming compulsively good or loving our neighbour we sacrifice our personal enjoyment (or *jouissance*). Mr Bennet’s comment also reveals that the antagonism of the neighbour is needed for civilization, and that some satisfaction is derived from this antagonism (pleasure and pain). To turn against this “Thing” that is within his neighbours is to turn against himself.[[48]](#footnote-48) What Lacan is in fact describing is what Feldenkrais describes as a parasitic relationship. The parasitic for Feldenkrais describes the compulsion to perform actions, which seem necessary, but in fact impede essential human functioning or well-being.[[49]](#footnote-49) In Lacan, the parasitic is conceived as a negotiation of the neighbour. For Lacan, the love of the neighbour is “beyond the pleasure principle,” that is (*pace* Freud) a “least-suffering principle… [that] keeps us a long way from our *jouissance*,” and this guarantees ethical happiness.[[50]](#footnote-50) In other words, following Freud, Lacan and indeed the example of Mr Bennett, happiness cannot be achieved through this parasitic relationship. In the negotiation of the self to achieve this form of satisfaction, there is an undoing that is necessary, a letting-go, or a renegotiation with the neighbour. This has profound consequences as we shall see for Gould’s turn away from the public to recording, where this negotiation is more intelligently resolved.Another concrete way to imagine what Lacan and Feldenkrais are describing can be imagined through the nuances that derive from a scenario on the London Underground. Firstly, I sit in a carriage and pretend to hibernate in my personal space (perhaps listening to music through headphones), and I refrain from looking at my neighbours (even if they smile at me or I think that they have smiled at me), so I temporarily close my eyes as a screen. I shelter in the anonymity of the crowd, so that I do not have to return their gaze or engage with the possibility of communication. In performing this anonymity, I also give up my own *jouissance*; because I do not engage with the others’ “Thing,” and in doing this, I don’t have to engage with my own. Then, in my position of hibernation, I open my eyes and see someone who needs to sit down (perhaps an elderly person). I make an assessment of their needs, and although I am tired, I give up my seat (my comfort for their comfort). Although, this may or may not have been a spontaneous or altruistic decision (the proper Christian position), I am left with the sensation of regret, despite knowing that I have done a “good deed” and given something that did not cost me very much (it did not cost my life or any money). My *jouissance* is spoiled, following Lacan’s thinking, not only because of a lack of comfort, but because I now feel guilty for feeling like the “good samaritan” (Luke 10: 25-37). I am left questioning whether I should feel joy in my act, whether this joy means that I have merely succeeded in negotiating past my own selfishness, and whether the service I have rendered has been good enough. Finally, other people sitting in the carriage who also observed the elderly person and who assessed that person’s needs, now feel bad too. They saw me give up my seat, but they did not do it themselves. I feel uneasy with my motivations in the decisions, and perhaps most ironically, the elderly person also feels uncomfortable because they have made me vacate my seat. Through being a “good neighbour,” in this scenario everyone was a loser in some way. A further fog remains over this scene that results from the big Other (the Lacanian name for the unmentioned codes and injunctions that dominate human action): all of what transpired was done with as few words as possible (minimal communication is a necessity), and therefore what is really difficult in this scene is the unknowable ‘impenetrable’ desires of our neighbours.[[51]](#footnote-51) One might have a wry laugh at this scenario, but it is illustrative of the difficulties we make for ourselves, troubles that are totally unnecessary, but that we learn to live with, and that in a Feldenkraisian vein, stop us reaching our potential. Worse, we enjoy these symptoms of our own collective failure – the big Other is not just ‘somewhere else’; it is a creation of each and every one of us. These symptoms therefore powerfully point back to ourselves, through what Lacan calls the *sinthome*, an idea that is present in a different sense in Feldenkrais’s thought. A symptom, as the musicologist Michael L. Klein explains, is “a sign from the unconscious that demands interpretation(.)…a symptom is a message from the Real addressed through the unconscious to the Symbolic.”[[52]](#footnote-52) My simple action in giving up my seat is symbolic of many things, but it points to an underlying trauma caused by obeying the compulsion of the injunction to be a “good neighbour.” The traumatic underlying problem is registered in language and behaviour, goodness, guilt or regret for example; it can be interpreted but in fact leads back to an unassimilable and unreachable source in the self. The *sinthome* turns the telescope around on the symptom. It occurs when hermeneutics run dry and when we come to the realisation that the explanations we give for the symbolic [“I did this because…”] are not the answers. The problem lies reflexively in something of which we are unaware within ourselves. “The *sinthome*,” Klein writes, “is a form of enjoyment (*jouissance*) that comes from the constant deferral of a final interpretation demanded by the symbolic.”[[53]](#footnote-53) A final interpretation of the situation on the London Underground above is simply catastrophic: it is that through our intention to do good we come to an abyss of failure. The problem lies not in my actions or my interpretation of my actions, but in the screen that I create that prevents me realising the full toll of this situation. What is missing here in Feldenkrais’s terms is awareness of my actions. To apply the *sinthome* to Feldenkrais’s thought, education and our attitudes to the body can be understood to be symptoms of civilization, but the *sinthome* that acts to bind or suture these items together is the traumatic “Thing,” an element of the Real that is within the individual, but that we defer from to preserve our *jouissance*. *Jouissance* in acts as a screen to prevent our own sense of comfort in action. This is something experienced at many levels. When I roll over in bed at night for example, I might deem the results of this action ‘good enough’, but the movement, upon closer examination, is perhaps not very fluent or comfortable. There is a level of self-aggression involved here that is not clear to me. Next time you are brushing your teeth, ask yourself: “If I was brushing someone else’s teeth, would I do it this way?” The question then remains of how to escape from this economy of aggression. In an earlier study, Feldenkrais identifies the masochistic heart of this problem identified by Freud:

In a perfectly matured body, which has grown without great emotional disturbances, movements tend gradually to conform to the mechanical requirements of the surrounding world. The nervous system has evolved under the influence of these laws and is fitted to them. However, in our society we do, by the promise of great reward or intense punishment, so distort the even development of the system, that many acts become excluded or restricted. The result is that we have to provide special conditions for further adult maturation of many arrested functions.[[54]](#footnote-54)

For Feldenkrais then, learning should be a form of maturation, not of accustomising ourselves to the injunctions of the Lacanian big Other (parents, schools, society’s unwritten rules [thou shalt give up thy seat to those who need it!], or the beliefs imputed to a “jealous God” (Ex. 20:5, 34:14). Maturation is founded in the development of an awareness of *how* we do something and the development of “spontaneity.”[[55]](#footnote-55) Feldenkrais describes “compulsion,” in terms redolent of Freud’s essay, as “the symptom and the result of inhibited aggression,” and he says that it “is sensed when motivation for action is conflicting,” or “parasitic.”[[56]](#footnote-56) He further states that:

…all creative people do things in their own way … everybody else who has ever done anything worthwhile, always had to learn to paint, think, compose – but not in the way they were taught. They had to learn and work until they knew themselves sufficiently to bring themselves to the state of spontaneity in which their deepest inner self could be brought up and out. Such people are not free of compulsion – much to the contrary. The difference is that what they produce out of the state of compulsion has some value because of the true spontaneous nature of the production.[[57]](#footnote-57)

Compulsion and spontaneity intersect through the agency of awareness and choice (discussed extensively in the Introduction to this volume). The Feldenkrais Method and so much of Feldenkrais’s writing is grounded in the idea that in order to be a better human being, and to be a catalyst for society, one must be able to organize oneself. At the heart of this organization is not just an ability to choose (i.e. based on experience and judgment), but a form of self-education conceived of as building a viable and increasing set of options to effect “adaptive flexibility” as Esther Thelen puts it.[[58]](#footnote-58) Unless there is choice in any human activity – in sex, feeding, cleaning, education or in artistic creation - there can be no spontaneous action. Feldenkrais’s idea of spontaneity is also achieved through self-negotiation, through “maturation,” through the ability to use the imagination, through the ability to choose, but it operates in a way that is ideally free from the parasitic.[[59]](#footnote-59) “Love thyself as thy Neighbour,” is essential to these processes. It could naively be understood as a form of selfishness, but in Feldenkrais’s hands - “Love thyself as Thy Neighbour” - becomes about self-awareness, and *giving of permission* for self-love that values the uniqueness of the individual rather than subsuming the person within civilization. Feldenkrais’s alteration of Christ’s injunction is much closer to the attitude taken by the Austrian neurologist, psychiatrist, and Holocaust survivor Victor E. Frankl (1905-97), which might be put in a different way: “Look to your spontaneity, your own true human freedom, which only you have the power to control, and only through this can you (choose to) help your neighbour, and choose which neighbour can, and in fact, desires to be helped.”[[60]](#footnote-60) Feldenkrais’s proactive version of Christ’s injunction is a recognition that to be of use to civilization, a person must improve the ability *to be* and thence *to do*. It is, to borrow another biblical passage, an exhortation to take the log out of one’s own eye before dealing with someone else’s splinter (Matthew 7:3). The meaning of Feldenkrais’s thought is further clarified by transferring this thought to another injunction in the New Covenant. This might be understood not as: “Do unto others, as you would have done to yourself (Matthew 7: 12),” but: “Do for yourself first, so that you may be able truly *to do* much better for others.” This provides a new perspective on Feldenkrais’s proposition that he was not teaching his students but providing conditions for them to learn: this position allowed and gave them permission to explore their own uniqueness. Feldenkrais’s teaching is not prescriptive by nature, especially in the sense of “Do *this* (as I say), and you will get *that*,” nor more narcissistically: “Do as I do, and you will be as good as me!” His Method was designed to guide students to find their own spontaneity. For Feldenkrais, pleasure was an intimate aspect of spontaneity. Pleasure then arrives *through* or *in* spontaneity and not merely through the desire to reproduce right action that may arise from the big Other (such as the implied demands of civilization or a teacher). Pleasure in spontaneity for itself would be free from the types of conditions signalled by Freud and from the parasitic in Lacanian *jouissance*. In the following section of this study, I want to examine how these concepts can be understood in Gould’s decision to leave the concert platform, and how Gould came to use recording technology to create his own unique forms of *jouissance* andspontaneity for the neighbours’ benefit.

**III Gould’s Neighbour**

Glenn Gould withdrew from performing in public in 1964 and much is written about this, but not with any reference to psychoanalysis or the work of Feldenkrais. Reinhard, Eric L. Santner, and Slavoj Žižek provides insight into two positions that illuminate different facets of Gould’s action:

Neurosis and psychosis represent two asymmetrical modes of the failure to love the neighbour: whereas the neurotic becomes an autonomous subject of desire in turning away from the impossibility of the command to love the neighbour, the psychotic fails to achieve subjectivity [i.e. they lose the sense of themselves in their action] while succeeding in experiencing the other as radically other, loving the neighbour not wisely, but too well.[[61]](#footnote-61)

While these two positions outline stereotypes, Gould’s position is more complex. His is a perhaps little closer to that of the paranoic who sees or imagines the gaze of the Other (where there is none in the recording studio), experiencing by proxy the *jouissance* of the unknown gaze or listener.[[62]](#footnote-62) Gould arguably used recording as a screen to protect himself from the Other, but also to enable himself to assume a fantasy place in the listener’s imagination, avoiding the traumatic presence of proximity in the concert hall.[[63]](#footnote-63) His self-negotiation and decision not to play in public and escape parasitic and repetitive action can, in Feldenkraisian terms, be better understood as an attempt to create a new form of spontaneity. Gould understood continual concertizing as “an endless series of imperfect, transient experiences of a work, which became stale and distorted through over-exposure;”[[64]](#footnote-64) the life of a concert pianist was an aggressive economy of duty and expectation. For him what was missing was the opportunity to sculpt an ideal interpretation rather than merely present a re-presentation. My presentation of Gould here contrasts for instance with that of the musicologist Colin Symes who promotes the obvious libidinal and utopian interpretations of Gould’s turn away from the concert platform. He avers that Gould’s turn to the recording studio “had nothing to do with the absence of an audience and everything to do with the electronic technology that had become commonplace in the recording studios of the 1960s, which has revolutionized the way records were made, and had the potential to change the way music was ‘represented’ on disc.”[[65]](#footnote-65) Yes, Gould adored technology and had a “love affair with the microphone.”[[66]](#footnote-66) Through technology, Gould created syncretic representations of musical works, splicing many different ‘takes’ into one ideal or preferred recorded artistic choice. Paul Myers shows, Gould made “as many as ten or fifteen interpretations of the same piece - each of them quite different, many of them valid – as though examining the music from every angle before deciding upon a final performance.”[[67]](#footnote-67) In the recording studio, Gould seemingly becomes the archetypal “neurotic,” who also, like Reinhard’s “psychotic,” searches for his own true subjectivity, and seemingly fails to achieve this. Recording becomes a fantasy pursuit of an ideal interpretation and a way of realising this “unavowed dream.” The virtual, prosthetic and syncretic nature of recording - recording, re-recording and splicing term tape in search an archetype, which seems like the least spontaneous means possible - can be understood in this sense as Gould’s way out of parasitic action towards Feldenkraisian spontaneity and a form of health. This description of recording indicates that there is a different form of creative aggression present in recording; arguably Gould throws one economy of aggression over for another. However, Gould emphasises often emphasises the emancipatory element of working in this way.[[68]](#footnote-68) The process of recording provided a means for perpetual improvement rather than merely production. Gould’s “decision” needs to understood not as merely motivated by technology, or just a desire to be recluse, or to produce a perfect product, but as an effective and radical act of self-love. His choice not to play, and his freedom to choose, shows an abnegation of the masochism and the masochistic culture of public performance, and of the super-ego cultural ideal of the contract with the listener (the neighbour) that must be fulfilled. Not performing was for Gould not some heroic hair-shirt; neither was Gould only merely hibernating from the trauma of the neighbour: the germ-ridden, coughing, fidgeting, farting, applauding, judging being that pays to make him their servant, even as he is idolized.[[69]](#footnote-69) Gould’s spontaneity needs to be understood in Feldenkrais’s terms. His pianism is a striking example of what Feldenkrais calls a “maturity,” embodied in ”the freedom from internal compulsion that accompanies the process.”[[70]](#footnote-70) This is evidenced in his direction of his own imagination, and his work away from what he saw as the limiting mechanical and physical qualities of the piano. However, anyone who watches Gould’s final films, for instance the Bruno Monsaingeon film of him playing some of Bach’s *Art of Fugue* (1980), or of Bach’s *Goldberg Variations* (1981), might also agree with Feldenkrais that the compulsive behaviour on display “has some value because of the true spontaneous nature of the production.”[[71]](#footnote-71) Compulsion therefore is mostly integrated into action, or action can be thought of as so “high-functioning,” in Maloney’s sense, that the compulsion appears to be part of it.[[72]](#footnote-72) Compulsion is essential to Gould’s unique presence, to his “Thing” which is indivisible from his physical organisation (internal and external) and the particular sound he made when he touched the piano. This “Thing” is often passed off as “eccentricity,” but is in fact essential to Gould’s persona.[[73]](#footnote-73) In his uniqueness is the revelation of a kernel of otherness and foreignness that arguably brings the listener closer to their own “Thing.” Uniqueness has a mimetic function and reminds the listener, in Feldenkrais’s terms of “where” they stopped “being human beings”: where their own unique qualities became disavowed through their own inactions as much as the pressure of the big Other.[[74]](#footnote-74) The proximity of recording, especially the sort of “tight shot” closeness with which Gould came to record (an inheritance from jazz recordings by Miles Davis and Oscar Peterson for example), brings the listener closer to his “Thing.”[[75]](#footnote-75) Gould imagined a certain listener autonomy whereby his “Thing” could be manipulated by changing the different microphone levels (positioned in different parts of the hall) for example. Gould’s “acoustic orchestrations” of Sciabin and Sibelius, enable the listener to become a better prosthetic articulation of his “Thing,” making them a “conscientious consumer of recorded music,” and giving them “unprecedented spontaneity of judgment.”[[76]](#footnote-76) One way of conceiving this “potentiality” is expressed in Gould’s invisible reforming of narrative time in his recording. Gould at once undermines the unified experience of time given in a performance by making recordings that are syncretic (made of many takes spliced together). These *choices* point to perhaps the greatest irony about Gould. Despite his syncretic, choreographic recording techniques, his “Thing” *remains*.[[77]](#footnote-77) In this sense, what the literary critic Edward Said has described as Gould’s ability through virtuosity “to draw the audience in by provocation, [and] the dislocation of expectation,” is merely a symptom that points to the *sinthome* of Gould himself.[[78]](#footnote-78) Recording attempts to overcome but in fact exacerbates the problem of “symbolic castration,” defined as the “gap between [his] direct psychological identity and [his] symbolic identity” (the difference between a person’s image in the world, and their private self). It makes an idealised self-image. This should be understood more positively as an attempt to reintegrate the presence of the performer as recreator into the work. Recording for Gould is therefore not wholly-dominated by compositional or historical interpretational imprimatur [thou shalt play this way or…!], but it offers a laboratory space for interpretation. In a Feldenkraisian sense, like in an ATM lesson, recording provided an opportunity to find different choices about how to perform a function. But recording also provided a prosthetic means for Gould to interpret himself. A musical work especially through recording therefore was, in a Lacanian sense, a medium for exploring the *sinthome* of Gould. I am not pretending in any way that Gould’s recordings allow the listener to *know* Gould, but his “Thing,” his uniqueness, acts as a fascinator. Through his “Thing,” Gould’s interpretations also allow something of the uniqueness of each composer being interpreted to be heard. The eccentricity and originality of Beethoven’s music (Beethoven’s “Thing”) is heard uniquely, and it is both irreducible and unrepeatable in this sense because of its presence in Gould’s own *sinthome*. By providing access to his “Thing,” through recording, he arguably undermines the normalisation of Beethoven performance (through culture, and time and financial constraints on recording for example), and in so doing it he reframes the universalism of this music, understood as ideological homogeneity and cultural hegemony.[[79]](#footnote-79) Gould steps outside the cultural expectation of the neighbour - the listener to Beethoven – who expects Beethoven to sound a particular way. He holds a mirror to the listener’s “attitude,” and the degree to which the exceptional or “eccentric” aspects of Gould come to dislocate their own “Thing.” With these thoughts in mind, it is fascinating to sample a small ethnographic snapshot of Gould. On one website, commentators have allowed themselves the sort of free reign that anonymity provides. Gould is described as a “psycho,” as a “one-trick pony” (i.e. he could only play Bach), as a pianist who “butchered Beethoven,” leaving an “overall feeling of blasphemy and violation,” despite his commitment to the music, playing as if “possessed and mesmerised” by the music.[[80]](#footnote-80) In an article in the Guardian newspaper, revealingly entitled “Glenn Gould: a wilfully idiotic genius?,” four concert pianists more cautiously comment on Gould.[[81]](#footnote-81) These comments in themselves are interesting partly in themselves, as a sampling of the critical temperature and passive/aggressive ire that Gould arouses, but mostly because of the unwritten libidinal economy (the unconscious desires) of the writers. The subtexts of their commentaries could be summarized on a spectrum from “He was cleverer than us,” or “Well, if he was so clever, why is he not like us?” to “Ok, we know Gould was eccentric and we will tolerate this up to a point…”, to “Gould has betrayed our idea of Beethoven [by Artur Schnabel, Claudio Arrau, Sviatoslav Richter, Daniel Barenboim, Alfred Brendel etc.], and he should not be taken seriously as an artist. Therefore, people who are really interested in (this) music should not listen to him.” The implication here is that he transgressed “our community,” and therefore he should be understood at best as a maverick, at worst, as a pariah.[[82]](#footnote-82) But, we should reverse this, and say that it is because of such comments that Gould becomes such a “yardstick” of what is possible, a mirror to the libidinal economy of recordings (of perfection and ideals of ‘correctness’) and the way these have become, through late-capitalism, merely another facet of the prosthetic hardwiring of civilization into the parasitic *jouissance* of technology. Gould’s “urge for freedom,” as Freud puts it, enables him to transgress his community and thence to become a better prosthesis of its “cultural ideal” and of commodity fetishism.[[83]](#footnote-83) His is not a “renunciation of instinct,” that presupposes a “non-satisfaction (by suppression, repression or some other means) of powerful instincts,” but a harnessing of it. He therefore provides an ideal exemplar of Feldenkrais’s qualification of Christ’s injunction.[[84]](#footnote-84)

**IV Conclusion: Shake your “Thing”!**

In this chapter I have used the ideal of the neighbour as a lens to examine aspects of musical performance. The question of what the neighbour wants and what they are doing is to a large extent set aside by Gould. To ask why Gould plays Beethoven’s ‘Appassionata’ piano sonata Op. 57 (the first movement is almost a half of the ‘normal’ *Allegro assai* speed used by performers) is in fact to ask questions of our indoctrination to cultural norms and presuppositions.Gould in this work becomes a provocative reaction against cultural rules and listeners’ implicit desires. That he does not ‘obey’ the big Other (the tendency to normalisation), but follows to his own path is deeply disturbing for some, and yet also perversely entrancing. Gould’s prediction that “the habit of concert going and concert giving” would disappear has not only proven unfounded, but has been substantially shown to be incorrect. This “chief symbol of musical mercantilism,” has in fact retained and enhanced its status.[[85]](#footnote-85) Through social media for example, performance has attained its own forms of celebrity culture. The “Thing” has therefore gone virtual and acquired commercial interests: it is “out there.” The aspects of individuality and spontaneity demonstrated by Gould can provide a useful critique of arts-based education.[[86]](#footnote-86) The search for uniqueness would facilitate immersion and mastery, rather than merely servicing a curriculum (a function of the big Other); it could bring about “flexible bodies and brains,” as Feldenkrais states.[[87]](#footnote-87) The support for uniqueness would be a search for an order that does not obey the big Other’s demands for the normative, for agreement, for certainty, and for the ordinary, but would act as a form intra-sensory critique, listening to the potential to realise our “unavowed dreams” within ourselves.[[88]](#footnote-88) Institutions and educators bear a responsibility to think about the ways in which they can facilitate this, to learn to think beyond their own limitations and what might have worked last year, and to examine how they can balance the (big Other) demands of the profession with the development of artistic uniqueness, and the demands of art itself. Feldenkrais always said that he wasn’t teaching but merely providing ideal conditions for people to learn. This was, as I have shown in this study, to shift the emphasis back onto the development of the uniqueness of the person through a form of learning where there is exploration rather than judgment. This would be a way of learning where mastery is attained through time spent finding multiple different ways to do something rather than working with the fear of meeting the unknown and often unrealistic expectations of society, teachers, other performers, and the listening public. This requires a form of slow learning, moving and listening softly, listening the way in which our limitations are self-generated (by culture and our own habits especially) and the ways in which we challenge these limitations. The Feldenkrais Method promotes a dialogue between outside and inside; to change one way of acting, the way we hold our head, the tonus of the hand, the spine, chest and ribs, the skin between the eyes, is to change everything. To develop a soft, comfortable way of doing, employing skill not will, requires a way of listening and learning that facilitates more joy, flexibility, autonomy and a sense of the uniqueness of what we do as creative artists.

Gould provides an exemplar of this kind of self-investment, and of the ways in which different ways of learning and different kinds of creativity can coalesce. To follow the examples of Feldenkrais and Gould would be to value and reward not only uniqueness, but to understand how multiple ‘uniquenesses’ can be facilitated. This would be a conduit “to know what you are doing, so you can do what you want.” At the heart of this ideal is a cherishing of the “Thing,” loving oneself first better to “love thy neighbour.”

**Addendum**

Listening to children practise an instrument is often very instructive. They often vocalise what adults might sublimate. “I don’t like practise”… “this is too hard”…”Why do you (the composer, the teacher, the big Other) want me to do this?” or there is sometimes just a deep sigh (as if from the soul), which combines these thoughts and others as if the weight of humanity’s burden of difficulty since the beginning of time has found its harvest home. ‘To improve’ therefore means to improve not just a localised problem, but something much more profound. It is important to develop a sense of our own creaturely feeling, using our own intelligence to move in the most elegant and aesthetically-pleasurable way. Feldenkrais at one point in his Quest workshops states that this acquisition “is priceless.”[[89]](#footnote-89) If we do not do this we might feel “Oh, what I am doing is not good enough” and even ”…I am no good.” But this sense and intelligence needs space in order to be enactivated. Here is a suggestion to alleviate this impasse. We need to move slowly to find out *how* we do something, and to learn the patience to do this. But how does one do this? Take any technical problem in your work, and do it very slowly, but before you do it, have the intention to it in the softest, most pleasurable, most luxuriant and comfortable way possible. Pay attention to the smallest parts of the movement – the beginning and end of a single note for example, or how you move from one note to the next. How could you enjoy every part of what you are doing (and of yourself) to the utmost?[[90]](#footnote-90) Part of this question is concerned with listening to habitual action and how one can include more of oneself in an action. Which parts of yourself participate in the action of laughing at a joke? For some people it seems that their whole body is involved – they seem to be enjoying the joke more than others, even if they are may be unaware of what is happening. This type of awareness is crucial and needs focus. For example, how can a violinist use their pelvis, and weight transference through the feet in their action, or how can a pianist use their sternum in their action, or how can an organist employ subtle movements in their ribs when they play the organ pedals with their feet? Can a singer choose to sing with vibrato or not, and can they control this vibrato as a means of expression rather than as habit or as a demand of the big Other? Thinking in these imaginative and non-habitual ways is a ramification of Feldenkrais’s teaching; it leads to an understanding that difficulty (in doing something) is not really present in the object (the score for example), but is present in an incomplete self-image, in both thought and movement patterns. Finding out what this is requires a form of listening to what is missing - to what is missing in our self-listening and what our habits of listening are – and *doing* in this way I suggest helps find this missing key. This is not done to please someone else or to say to someone else – “look how good I am; look how nicely I do it!” Rather, this kind of learning develops a sense of pleasure, as the quality of the activity and the engagement of your whole self in the activity improves so that you come to be as you would like to be; we can perhaps learn to love ourselves sufficiently so that we can love our neighbour better. In this way of working you can find something of your uniqueness as a creative artist, and also discover something of the contribution that you can make to your art.

1. Mosche Feldenkrais, “Discussion of Habits and Fear,” *New York Quest Workshop*, 1981 (San Diego: Feldenkrais Resources, n.d). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Sigmund Freud, “Jokes and their relation to the Unconscious,” (1905) in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, Vol. VIII, trans. and ed. James Strachey (London: Vintage books, 2001). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Leontyne Price at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EqVu_wlxTzM> (accessed 10 June 2020). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Feldenkrais, “Introduction: Love thyself as Thy Neighbour,” *The Potent Self:* *A Study of Spontaneity and Compulsion* (California: Frog Publications, 1985), xxxvii-xliv. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Freud, “Civilization and its Discontents,” (1930) in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, Vol. XXI (1927-1931) trans. and ed. James Strachey (London: Vintage books, 2001). See Jacques Lacan, *Seminar VII, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Dennis Potter (Routledge: London and New York, 1992), 220-34. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Feldenkrais, “Learning, Free Choice, Individuality,” *New York Quest Workshop*, 1981. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. See Geoffrey Payzant on Gould’s attitude to audiences and other pianists’ attitudes in *Glenn Gould: Music and Mind*, 23. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Rhona Bergman, *The Idea of Gould* (Philadelphia: Lev publishing, 1999), 48. Interview with Alex Trebek in 1966 at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1nZTgAGSajA> (accessed 29 April 2020). [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. See Slavoj Žižek, ”Love thy Neighbour? No Thanks!,” in *The Plague of Fantasies* (London: Verso, 1997), 58-9, 61. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Žižek,”Love thy Neighbour? No thanks!,” 65. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents*, 91-2. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Feldenkrais, “Discussion: Relationships, Change and the Self,” *New York Quest Workshops*, 1981. On Feldenkrais and Gould see also: Sholl, “Feldenkrais’s Touch, Ephram’s Laughter, Gould’s Sensorium: Listening and Musical Practice between Thinking and Doing,” *Journal of the Royal Musical Association*, Vol. 144, No.2 (2019), 397-428. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Arved Ashby, *Absolute Music, Mechanical Reproduction* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), 92. On Gould and psychoanalysis, see Geoffrey Payzant *Gould: Music and Mind* (Toronto: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1978), 73-4, and Peter Ostwald, *Glenn Gould: The Ecstasy and Tragedy of Genius* (New York: Norton, 1997), 102-3. See also S. Timothy Malony “Glenn Gould, Autistic Savant,” *Sounding Off: Theorizing Disability in Music*, ed. Neil Lerner and Joseph N. Straus (New York: Routledge, 2006), 121-35. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Feldenkrais, *The Potent Self*, 23-9 and 111-126, and Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, *The Language of Psychoanalysis* (London: The Hogarth Press, 1973), 394. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents*, 65. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. See Feldenkrais, *Thinking and Doing* (Longmont CO: Genesis II, 2013). [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Feldenkrais, *Awareness Through Movement* (London: Penguin, 1972), 87-9, 136-7. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents*, 67. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. See Betty Lee, cited in Payzant, 34. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents*, 77. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents*, 77 and 78. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Payzant, *Glenn Gould: Music and Mind*, 22-3. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents*, 76-81, 83 and Feldenkrais, *The Potent Self*, xli. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents*, 86. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents*, 95. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents*, 96. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents*, 97. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Feldenkrais, *The Potent Self*, xxxvii, and 34-5 on symptoms. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents*, 109-110. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents*, 112. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents*, 119, 122. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Feldenkrais, *The Potent Self*, xliii, xlii. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Feldenkrais, *San Francisco Feldenkrais Method Training* (San Diego; Feldenkrais Resources, 1977). [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Feldenkrais, *The Potent Self*, xxxviii. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Payzant, *Glenn Gould: Music and Mind*, 21. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents*, 134. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Feldenkrais, *The Potent Self*, xl. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Feldenkrais, *The Potent Self*, 92. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Feldenkrais, *The Potent Self*, 92. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents*, 142. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents*, 142-3, 145. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents*, 149. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. Lacan, *Seminar VII*, 62. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. Kenneth Reinhard, “Towards a Political Theology of the Neighbor,” *The Neighbour: Three Inquiries in Political Theology* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013), 32. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. Dylan Evans, *An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis* (London: Routledge, 1996), 150. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Jane Austen, *Pride and Prejudice*, Chapter 57 at https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1342/1342-h/1342-h.htm#link2HCH0015 [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. Reinhard, “Towards a Political Theology of the Neighbor,” 45. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. Lacan, *Seminar VII*, 229, 65. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. See Feldenkrais, *The Potent Self*, 108. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. Lacan, *Seminar VII*, 227-8, 82. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. Žižek, *Against the Double Blackmail: Refugees, Terror and Other Troubles with the Neighbours* (London: Penguin, 2016), 73. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. Michael L Klein, *Music and the Crises of the Modern Subject* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2015), 102-3. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. Klein, *Music and the Crises of the Modern Subject*, 118. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. Feldenkrais, *Higher Judo* (London: Frederick Warne, 1962), 47. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. Feldenkrais, *The Potent Self*, xl. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. Feldenkrais, *The Potent Self*, xxxvii, and 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. Feldenkrais, *The Potent Self*, xl. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. Esther Thelen, “The Central Role of Action in Typical and Atypical Development,” *Movement and Action in Learning and Development: Clinical Implications of Pervasive Developmental Disorders*, ed. Ida J. Stockman (San Diego: Academic Press, 2004), 71. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. On the imagination, see Feldenkrais, *Thinking and Doing*, 8-9. He writes: “Any thought developed in accordance with this plan will be manifest in the unconscious and become realized in actual life.” [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. Victor E. Frankl, *Man’s Search for Meaning* (London: Rider, 2004), and Feldenkrais, *The Potent Self*, xliv. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. Reinhard, Santner, and Žižek, “Introduction” to *The Neighbour: Three Inquiries in Political Theology*, 7. On Gould’s pre-performance activities, see Payzant, 76, and Malony, “Glenn Gould, Autistic Savant,” 121-2. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. Žižek, ”Love thy Neighbour? No Thanks!,” 73. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. Žižek, “Love thy Neighbour? No Thanks!,” 85. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. Bazzana, *Wondrous Strange: The Life and Art of Glenn Gould*, 260. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. Colin Symes, “Variations on a Theme of Nelson Goodman as a Arranged by Glenn Gould for the Piano Phonograph,” in *Recorded Music: Philosophical and Critical reflections*, ed. Mine Doğantan-Dack (Hendon: Middlesex University Press, 2008), 49. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. See Gould in Payzant, 37. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. See Myers in Payzant, 50, and Gould, “The Prospects of Recording,” *The Glenn Gould Reader*, ed. Tim Page (London: Faber 1984), 338-9. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. Gould, “The Prospects of Recording,” 339, and “We Who Are About to be Disqualified Salute You!”, 250-55. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. See T.W. Adorno, *Introduction to the Sociology of Music*, trans. E.B. Ashton (New York: The Seabury Press, 1976), 106. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. Feldenkrais, *The Potent Self*, 101 [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. Feldenkrais, *The Potent Self*, xi. [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. Malony, “Glenn Gould, Autistic Savant,” 121-136. [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. See Bazzana, *Wondrous Strange: The Life and Art of Glenn Gould*, 316-29, and Laplanche and Pontalis on the ideal-ego, 201. [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. Feldenkrais, “Learning, Free Choice, Individuality,” *New York Quest Workshop*, 1981. [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. Gould in <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JllD47HIees> (accessed 4 May 2020). [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. Gould, “Strauss and the Electronic Future,” (1964) in *The Glenn Gould Reader*, 93, 99. [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. Gould, “The Prospects of Recording,” 338. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. Edward Said, *On Late Style: Music and Literature against the Grain* (London: Bloomsbury, 2007), 117. [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. See Žižek in *Against the Double Blackmail*, 75-6. [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. <http://www.talkclassical.com/1186-goulds-beethoven.html> (accessed 4 May 2020). [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. <https://www.theguardian.com/music/2012/sep/20/glenn-gould-wilfully-idiotic-genius> (accessed 4 May 2020). [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
82. An important aspect of this transgression is that Gould appears to usurp the image of the artist as servant of music to place himself seemingly outside the audience’s gaze, but, as I argue, he merely finds a better way of using himself through technology. See Tim Hecker, “Glenn Gould, the Vanishing Performer and the Ambivalence of the Studio,” *Leonardo Music Journal*, Vol. 18, *Why Live? Performance in the Age of Digital Reproduction* (2008), 79. Hecker’s argument that Gould’s work in the studio was a form of “self-erasure” (p. 77) and “retreat,” (p. 83) although supported by biographical evidence, is diametrically opposed to the thinking in the chapter. [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
83. Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents*, 96. [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
84. Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents*, 97. [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
85. Gould, “The Prospects of Recording,” 331-32. [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
86. See Thomas Kampe, “The Art of Making Choices: the Feldenkrais Method as Soma-critique,” *Attending to Movement: Somatic Perspectives on Living in this World*, ed. Sarah Whatley, Natalie Garrett-Brown and Kirsty Alexander (Axminster: Triarchy Press, 2015), 86-7. [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
87. Saying attributed to Feldenkrais and widely understood in the Feldenkrais community. [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
88. See Sylvie Fortin “Looking for blind spots in somatics’ evolving pathways,“ *Journal of Dance and Somatic Practices*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2017), 146. [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
89. “a) Pressing and lifting on the side, opening and closing hand to stand b) Variations in standing c) Pressing again on side, making a wave.” *New York Quest Workshop*, 1981. [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
90. Such a comment might seem simple or simplistic, but it is part of what Feldenkrais calls “the elusive obvious.” [↑](#footnote-ref-90)